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RESPONSE TO EVANS'S OBJECTION 
TO THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Plaintiff/appellee Jamie Evans disagrees with defendant/appellant the Board 
of County Commissioners of Utah County's ("County's") inclusion of language 
from Carrier v. Lindquist, 2001 UT 105, 37 P.3d 1112, recognizing "a measure of 
discretion," id. at f l l , granted district court judges when deciding whether an 
easement exists. He asserts this "somewhat more deferential standard does not 
apply where, as here, the material facts are undisputed,...." (Aplee.'s Br. at 2.) 
Evans offers no support for this contention. The County agrees that the material 
facts are undisputed, but disagrees that their settled status precludes granting 
Judge Howard's application of the correct legal standard to the facts of this case "a 
broad measure of discretion." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 311 (Utah 
1998). 
RESPONSE TO EVANS'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Evans states that "[i]t is undisputed that the parties intended to create the 
Easement." (Aplee.'s Br. at 3 & 8-9.) As the County noted in its brief below, 
however, it disputes ever intending to create Evans's easement1, but assumed it 
was mutually approved for the limited purpose of its motion for summary 
judgment, and, consequently, Evans's appeal thereof. (Aplee.'s Br., Utah Ct. App. 
at 4 & 10 n.6.) The court of appeals addressed that assertion by stating that the 
County accepted the reservation when it accepted and recorded the deed 
conveying the Strip. See Evans v. Board of County Comm 'rs, 2004 UT App 256, 
1
 The County herein continues using the same terminology it employed in its opening 
brief: "Evans's reservation" or "Evans's easement" refers to the exception and 
reservation included in Evans's predecessor's quitclaim deed to the County, and the 
"Strip" refers to the 120-foot-by-760-foot strip of property to the south of Pine Street. 
(Aplt.'sBr. at 2-6.) 
TffilO & 12 n.5, 97 P.3d 697. To the extent the court of appeals's decision means 
that a county's mere ministerial recordation of a deed signifies acceptance, the 
County disputes the court's conclusion. However, that issue is not presented here. 
The Course of Proceedings 
Evans lists several reasons the district court found his reservation invalid 
(Aplee.'s Br. at 4), yet the narrower issue presented here is whether his reservation 
was sufficiently specific (Aplt.'s Br. at 1). The County's argument focuses on 
what it terms the second portion of the reservation, a right of way "over and 
across" (Aplt.'s Br. at 5) the Strip between Pine Street and Evans's property. 
(Aplt.'s Br. at 6-7.) Thus, while Judge Howard's conclusion that "there exists no 
physical improvement, fixture, or use of Pine Street occurring since the dedication 
of the Ironton Subdivision Plat 75 years ago" (Aplt.'s Br. at A42) has little bearing 
on this appeal, his finding that he was "unable to discern from the deed a location 
for an easement and [could not] reasonably discern a proper place to fix the 
location of the easement by virtue of existing fixtures" (Aplt.'s Br. at A42) is 
relevant to the lack of specificity of Evans's reservation. 
Further, the County disputes Evans's claim that "[t]he question presented 
does not include the Court of Appeals' rulings on the statute of frauds ...." 
(Aplee.'s Br. at 6.) The court of appeals's statute of frauds analysis was based in 
part on the requirement in Warburton v. Virginia Beach Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass 'n, 
899 P.2d 779 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), that language granting an easement must be 
certain and definite. See Evans, 2004 UT App 256, 1J9, 97 P.3d 697. Since the 
issue presented here is, in part, whether Evans's reservation of easement "was 
sufficiently specific to be enforceable" (Aplt.'s Br. at 1), it encompasses both the 
question of vagueness and the requirements of the statute of frauds. 
Statement of Facts 
Although Evans accepts the County's recitation of facts material to this 
appeal (Aplee.'s Br. at 7), he adds his interpretation of the language of his 
predecessor's quitclaim deed, including his conclusion that the reserved easement 
"runs across the 120-foot width of the Strip ..." (Aplee.'s Br. at 8). Because 
Evans later argues, based on this language, that the easement's length is 120 feet 
(Aplee.'s Br. at 29), the County must note that the reservation's actual language 
locates the easement "over and across" the Strip. (Aplt.'s Br. at 5.) Nothing in the 
reservation suggests a straight line was contemplated. 
The County also takes exception to Evans's unwarranted accusation that the 
County's decision to vacate several platted but unopened streets in the Ironton Plat 
was "no doubt ... an effort to clean up the legalities of the situation ...." (Aplee.'s 
Br. at 9.) His citation to the Record provides no support for his statement, and his 
attack on the County's motivations obscures the narrow issue presented here. 
ARGUMENT 
I. UNDER UTAH LAW, EVANS'S EXPRESS EASEMENT IS VOID 
BECAUSE IT FAILS TO SUFFICIENTLY SPECIFY ITS 
DIMENSIONS AND LOCATION. 
Although Evans concedes his reservation is "[inadequately [djefined" 
(Aplee.'s Br. at 11), he contends, based primarily upon his reading of 
extrajurisdictional law , that "the established rule in American law is that an 
express easement is valid even if the deed fails to specify its dimensions or 
location on the servient estate." (Aplee.'s Br. at 11.) Evans overstates his 
contention. 
While it appears that some jurisdictions have adopted that relaxed approach, 
the opinions are hardly unanimous. More importantly, Evans offers no persuasive 
2
 Of the sixty-nine cases listed in Evans's Table of Authorities, only fourteen are from 
Utah. (Aplee.'s Br. at iii-vi.) 
evidence that Utah courts apply the more lenient standard. In fact, an examination 
of Utah decisions, like Potter v. Chadaz, 1999 UT App 95, 977 P.2d 533, reveals 
that Utah courts require a reservation or grant of an express easement to 
sufficiently specify its dimensions and location. Therefore, because Evans's 
reservation of "a 56 foot wide right-of-way over and across [the Strip], from Pine 
Street to connect with the grantor's remaining property" (Aplt.'s Br. at 5) fails to 
meet this requirement, it is unenforceable. 
(a) The dimensions and location of an express easement are material 
terms. 
Evans does not dispute that Utah courts employ contract construction 
principles to interpret express easements, and labels the County's recitation that 
the absence of sufficiently specific essential terms renders a contract void 
"unremarkable." (Aplee.'s Br. at 27.) Though unclear, it appears Evans bases his 
opposition primarily on the idea that the dimensions and location of an express 
easement are not essential terms. He errs in that assessment. 
The clearest Utah decision to identify the boundaries and location of an 
express easement as essential terms is Potter. There, the court of appeals held that 
a reservation for a road over the east sixty-six feet of the conveyed property was 
not sufficiently specific because it did not "specify the boundaries of the easement 
or its exact location." Potter, 1999 UT App 95, f l l , 977 P.2d 533. Although he 
does not dispute the County's interpretation of Potter, Evans dismisses the holding 
as erroneous dictum because the decision goes on to address the concept of a 
"stranger to the deed," reaffirming that the doctrine precludes a reservation for the 
benefit of a third party. (Aplee.'s Br. at 24-26.) Evans's analysis is inverted: 
assuming either analysis constitutes dictum (the County suggests neither is, for 
reasons explained below), it is the "stranger to the deed" discussion, not the 
analysis invalidating the easement as "not sufficiently detailed." Potter, 1999 UT 
App95,1|ll,977P.2d533. 
After the Potter court held that the reservation's "vague language d[id] not 
constitute a definite and ascertainable description of the property/' id., it 
continued: "[h]owever, even if we were to assume that this language were 
sufficient to create an express easement/' the stranger to the deed doctrine would 
preclude enforcement. Id. at f 12 (emphasis added). Consequently, if one of these 
analyses constitutes a statement "concerning some rule of law or legal proposition 
not necessarily involved nor essential to determination of the case in hand ...." 
Black's Law Dictionary ASA (6th ed. 1990) (defining "dictum"), it is Potter's 
ensuing stranger to the deed analysis, built upon the false assumption that the 
easement language was sufficient. 
A more accurate way to view Potter, however, is stating alternative reasons 
for nullifying the easement at issue, meaning that neither the insufficient 
specificity nor the stranger to the deed analyses should be considered dictum. 
Where the opinion accompanying a decision invoked as a 
precedent states several reasons for the decision, although a single 
reason would have been sufficient to support the holding reached, 
none of the reasons indicated is to be considered as a mere dictum; 
rather, each is to be treated as a precedent embraced by stare decisis. 
20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 154 (2004) (footnote omitted). 
Though less clear than Potter, both Warburton v. Virginia Beach Fed. Sav. 
& Loan Ass 'n, 899 P.2d 779 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), and Southland Corp. v. Potter, 
760 P.2d 320 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), also support the conclusion that the 
dimensions and location of an express easement are essential terms. Evans's 
declaration that Southland's relevance is "a mystery" since the attempted easement 
at issue there suffered from multiple deficiencies (Aplee.'s Br. at 28) ignores the 
court's conclusion that the alleged easement-creating document's "range of 
meanings demonstrates that the writing lacks essential terms and provisions, ...." 
Southland, 760 P.2d at 322. While Warburton focused on the distinct question of 
whether the contract for country club membership at issue there sufficiently 
described an interest in real property to create an easement under the statute of 
frauds, that attention does not render the decision inapposite, as Evans suggests. 
(Aplee.'s Br. at 27-28.) Evans does not challenge the Warburton court's 
endorsement of the requirement that interests in property like express easements 
must sufficiently specify their boundaries. See Warburton, 899 P.2d at 781 n.4. 
The County also cited several Utah decisions in its opening brief evaluating 
conveyances of fee interests in deed and nondeed contexts (which, Evans does not 
dispute, require sufficiently specific boundary descriptions to be valid) as 
analogous support for similarly requiring grants or reservations of express 
easements in Utah to likewise sufficiently specify their boundaries and locations. 
(Aplt.'s Br. at 13-16.) Evans appreciates no such similarity between the two, and 
attempts to distinguish those cases simply by noting what the County already had 
acknowledged: that they do not deal with easements. (Aplee.'s Br. at 27-28.) Yet, 
this analogy is not without precedent. See, e.g., North Shore, Inc. v. Wakefield, 
530 N.W. 2d 297, 300 (N.D. 1995) ("[Exceptions or reservations of property in a 
deed should be set forth with the same prominence as the property granted and 
should be so explicit as to leave no room for doubt."); Vrabel v. Donahoe Creek 
Watershed Auth, 545 S.W. 2d 53, 54 (Tex. Cir. App. 1976) ("The rule relating to 
the sufficiency of descriptions of easements is the same as that required in 
conveyances of land."); Chesapeake Corp. v. McCreery, 216 S.E. 2d 22, 25 (Va. 
1975) ("The same principle [as that applied to deeds] is applicable to the 
description excepting or reserving certain property from the operation of a 
conveyance."). 
Indeed, the County's analysis matches that of the authoritative legal 
encyclopedia American Jurisprudence: "The grant [of an easement] should 
identify an easement's location with specificity. In other words, the description of 
the easement requires a certainty such that a surveyor can go on the land and 
locate the easement from such description."3 25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and 
Licenses in Real Property § 64 (2004) (footnotes omitted).4 
Decisions in several states bolster this perspective. For example, in Oliver 
v. Ernul, 178 S.E. 2d 393 (N.C. 1971), the North Carolina Supreme Court held a 
right-of-way agreement between several parties void. The court concluded the 
writing (which described a twenty-foot right of way between a railway and a 
highway, located by the boundaries of several plats identified by owner) was 
insufficient. The court held that "the location of the '20-foot rightaway' on the 
ground is vague, indefinite and uncertain. The language of the instrument vaguely 
describes the intended easement in such a manner that nothing can be located on 
3
 Grants and reservations of express easements are treated equally under Utah law. 
See Brown v. Christopher, 247 P. 503, 504-05 (Utah 1926) ("CA reservation of an 
easement in the deed by which the lands are conveyed is equivalent, for the purpose 
of the creation of the easement, to an express grant of the easement by the grantee of 
the lands.'" (quoting Wagner v. Hanna, 38 Cal. 111)). 
4
 Although Evans's passing reference to American Jurisprudence (Aplee.'s Br. at 11) 
appears contradictory, a closer examination reveals that he has modified the language 
he quotes. Without the modification, it is, at best, unclear whether it supports his 
assertion. The complete paragraph states: "The writing must contain a description of 
the land that is to be subjected to the easement with sufficient clarity to locate it with 
reasonable certainty. However, it is not necessary to designate with definiteness the 
part of the land to which the right attaches." 25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses 
in Real Property § 15 (2004) (footnotes omitted). In context, particularly with the 
specific language from the subsequent section quoted above, "the land that is to be 
subjected to the easement" likely means the servient estate, and the "land to which the 
right attaches" the dominant. 
the ground. The description contains no beginning and no ending." Id. at 597. 
Quoting extensively from a prior North Carolina case, the court explained that 
descriptions so vague and indefinite that they cannot be placed without resorting 
to circumstances not referred to in the writing itself suffer from patent ambiguities, 
and are void. 
When an easement is created by deed, either by express grant or by 
reservation, "the description thereof must not be so uncertain, vague 
and indefinite as to prevent identification with reasonable certainty.... 
If the description is so vague and indefinite that effect cannot be 
given the instrument without writing new material language into it, 
then it is void and ineffectual either as a grant or as a reservation." 
Id. at 597 (quoting Thompson v. Umberger, 19 S.E. 2d 484, 485 (N.C. 1942)). 
In Highway Properties v. Dollar Savings Bank, 431 S.E. 2d 95 (W. Va. 
1993), the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals found a purported reservation 
invalid. The language at issue deeded "'common parking and rights-of-way or 
easements in, to and across all parcels for ingress and egress from and to all other 
parcels/" Id. at 97 (quoting deed). The court held this language "totally 
inadequate," id. at 99, noting that "[n]one of the easement language identified the 
location or width of the easements on the land. The descriptions contained 
nothing that would serve to specify in the slightest degree any means of 
geographically locating the easements on the property," id. at 100. Similarly, in 
Vrabel v. Donahoe Creek Watershed Auth., 545 S.W. 2d 53 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976), 
the court found a grant of an easement of 111 acres out of a 250.5-acre tract void. 
The court reversed the trial court's decision fixing the easement's location, relying 
upon "the well established rule that for a contract to convey land to be sufficient, 
the description must be so definite and certain upon the face of the instrument 
itself, or, in some writing referred to, that the land can be identified with 
reasonable certainty." Id. at 54. The court elaborated that "[t]he description 
requires a certainty such that a surveyor can go upon the land and locate 
the easement from such description." Id. Other jurisdictions have held likewise.5 
Evans relies heavily on Bruce and Ely's The Law of Easements and 
Licenses in Land ("The Law of Easements") throughout his brief for the indefinite 
proposition that "'failure to indicate the easement's dimensions or its location on 
the servient property usually is not fatal to the contemplated servitude.'" (Aplee.'s 
Br. at 11 (quoting Jon W. Bruce & James W. Ely, Jr., The Law of Easements and 
Licenses in Land § 7:2 (West 2005) (emphasis omitted)).)6 In fact, Evans's 
footnote five and his assessment of Berg v. Ting, 850 P.2d 1349 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1993), overruled, 886 P.2d 564 (Wash. 1995), are recited from the treatise, as 
modified by the supplement, virtually verbatim. (Compare Aplee.'s Br. at 11-12 
& n.5 with Bruce & Ely, supra, § 7:2.) Yet, further examination reveals that the 
jurisdictions employing the "usual" approach apply rules of construction when 
interpreting easements distinct from those used in Utah. 
After stating that failing to indicate its dimensions or location is not usually 
fatal to an easement, Bruce and Ely explain that "[t]he generally accepted view is 
that extrinsic evidence may be used to identify the location and dimensions of the 
5
 See Kohl Indus. Park Co. v. County of Rockland, 710 F.2d 895, 903 (2d Cir. 1983) 
("When a prospective purchaser seeks to acquire an easement, New York courts 
require that party to identify with specificity the location and intended use for the 
estate."); Parkinson v. Board of Assessors, 481 N.E. 2d 491, 493 (Mass. 1985) 
("[T]he instrument must be sufficiently precise that 'a surveyor can go upon the land 
and locate the easement.'" (quoting Vrabel, 545 S.W. 2d at 54)); Germany v. 
Murdock, 662 P.2d 1346, 1348 (N.M. 1983) ("An easement requires the same 
accuracy of description as other conveyances. 'The description requires a certainty 
such that a surveyor can go upon the land and locate the easement from such 
description.'" (quoting Vrabel, 545 S.W. 2d at 54)). 
6
 As a courtesy, the County includes a copy of pertinent portions of The Law of 
Easements in the Addendum hereto. 
n, 
easement." Bruce & Ely, supra, § 7:2 (footnote omitted). Evans does not dispute, 
however, that, under contract law, Utah courts resort to extrinsic evidence only 
when they find an ambiguity. (Aplt.'s Br. at 10-11.) As the County has shown, an 
omission of an express easement's dimensions or location does not render it 
ambiguous, but rather unenforceable. Herein, then, lies the distinction between 
the cases Evans relies upon and Utah law: While the jurisdictions Evans cites 
apparently allow the admission of extrinsic evidence to determine an easement's 
dimensions and location, Utah courts cannot consider such evidence absent 
finding an ambiguity in the conveyance language, and omission of material terms 
does not create an ambiguity. 
Moreover, although Evans ignores it, Bruce and Ely expressly acknowledge 
several jurisdictions that reject the analysis he advocates. "North Carolina courts," 
they note, "take a significantly more restrictive approach to the description issue, 
holding that an easement grant or reservation is void for uncertainty if it does not 
adequately describe the location of the easement." Bruce & Ely, supra, § 7:6 
(footnote omitted). The Law of Easements also recognizes New Mexico, Texas, 
West Virginia, and Wyoming (which has enacted statutory requirements of 
sufficiency, see Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-1-141) as other jurisdictions employing a 
stricter standard for requiring descriptions of the dimensions and location of an 
express easement in the creating instrument. See id. Based upon the foregoing 
analysis, Utah squarely fits among these jurisdictions. 
Evans repeatedly cites to Thomas and Backman on Utah Real Property Law 
("Utah Real Property Law") to support his argument that an express easement's 
Indeed, in some jurisdictions even an ambiguity will nullify the easement. See 25 
Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses in Real Property § 18 (2004) ("[T]here is 
authority holding that a provision purporting to grant an easement must be strictly 
construed, with any doubt being resolved against establishment of the easement." 
(footnotes omitted)). 
in 
failure to sufficiently specify its dimensions or location does not render it void. 
(Aplee.'s Br. at 1, 26, 30.) He relies on the work for the "general rule" that the 
owner of a servient estate has "the first opportunity to set the scope of an 
inadequately described easement." If the dominant estate owner disagrees, the 
o 
treatise continues, she or he then may seek recourse from the courts. David A. 
Thomas & James H. Backman, Thomas and Backman on Utah Real Property Law 
§ 12.02(c) (LEXIS 1999) (footnote omitted)9; (Aplee.'s Br. at 1, 26, 30). Evans's 
reliance on this secondary source is unpersuasive for at least two reasons. First, 
this language from Utah Real Property Law cites to no authority other than 
another publication by the same authors. See Thomas & Backman, supra, § 
12.02(c). Second, the text does not identify what it means by "an inadequately 
described easement." Id. This language appears subsequent to the unambiguous 
statement that, "[i]f based on an explicit grant, the extent of an easement is 
determined by the grant," id. (footnote omitted), and a discussion of ambiguous 
writings. Thus, the authors could be referring to ambiguous, rather than 
o 
Oddly, this approach differs from that suggested by Evans. Under Evans's 
proposal, a servient owner would have an unspecified amount of time to locate the 
easement; failing to do so, the dominant owner would then have an unspecified time 
to locate it; and, finally, upon disagreement or both parties' failure to locate it, a court 
would do so. (Aplee.'s Br. at 30-31.) 
9
 Again, as a courtesy, the County includes a copy of pertinent portions of Utah Real 
Property Law in the Addendum hereto. 
insufficiently specific, descriptions. 
(b) Evans's reservation was not sufficiently specific. 
Although Evans contends "[t]he real question" posed on appeal is not 
whether his reserved easement was valid, but rather "how to properly define and 
locate" it (Aplee.'s Br. at 16), the County finds the issue formulated by this Court 
definitive: Was Evans's reservation "sufficiently specific to be enforceable" 
(Order Granting Cert. Nov. 5, 2004)? Since Evans's reservation cannot overcome 
this threshold hurdle, his recitation of various rules of construction gleaned from 
jurisdictions allowing the admission of extrinsic evidence to define an easement's 
dimensions and location is surplusage. 
Classifying this appeal as "an easy case," Evans argues that his reservation 
is sufficiently specific because it identifies its purpose, the dominant and servient 
estates, the grantor's intent to reserve11, the County's acceptance, and the 
In some respects, it appears that those jurisdictions upon which Evans relies to 
construct his rule allowing grantees the first opportunity to select the placement of 
the easement may be operating under a holdover from the common law canons of 
deed interpretation. "Although a number of early cases applied a common-law 
canon of construction under which, to overcome uncertainty as to the land 
conveyed, the grantee was allowed to select the land conveyed but not located, this 
rule of construction has been seldom cited in modern times." 23 Am. Jur. 2d 
Deeds § 43 (2004) (footnote omitted). 
11
 Throughout the briefing of this case, Evans has inferred a broad interpretation of 
the parties' "intent" in creating Evans's easement. (Aplee.'s Br. at 20, 21, 28-29; 
Resp't's Br., Pet. for Cert, at 3-4, 7; Aplt.'s Br., Utah Ct. App. at 4, 6, 8.) 
However, in the context of interpreting real property transactions in Utah, the term 
has a narrow meaning. In Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653 (Utah 1979), this Court 
explained that "the main object in construing a deed is to ascertain the intention of the 
parties, especially that of the grantor, from the language used"' Id. at 656 (emphasis 
original) (footnote omitted). The Court continued: "[T]he term 'intention,' as 
applied to the construction of a deed, is to be distinguished from its usual connotation. 
When so applied, it is a term of art and signifies a meaning of the writing." Id. 
(emphases original) (footnote omitted). 
easement's width. (Aplee.'s Br. at 29.) However, the only item in this list that 
begins to identify the essential terms of the easement's dimensions and location is 
its width, and that is insufficient. The face of the deed reveals that it purports to 
reserve "a 56 foot wide right-of-way over and across the [Strip]," which measures 
120 feet by 760 feet, for a total of 91,200 square feet, or a little more than two 
acres. (Aplt.'s Br. at 2.) Without more, it is impossible to locate or even define 
the extent of this attempted easement. All that is known is that Evans's 
predecessor attempted to reserve a fifty-six-foot-wide access between his and the 
County's properties that crosses more than two acres following an unknown path. 
The possible points of beginning and ending and paths the easement could follow 
approach innumerable. 
It is exactly this sort of indefmiteness that prompted the Potter court to find 
the reservation in that case unenforceable. There, the court rejected an attempted 
reservation of a sixty-six-foot-wide road between an identified street and the 
seller's property over the eastern portion of an approximately one-and-a-half-acre 
parcel as insufficiently specific. See Potter, 1999 UT App 95,1fl[l0-ll & 14-15, 
977 P.2d 533. The court of appeals's conclusion compels a similar finding here 
because Evans's description is even less definite. The Potter language identified 
the right of way's width, the servient and dominant estates, and even the general 
area on the servient estate where it should be located. Evans's attempted 
reservation provides no guidance where it should be located over an even larger 
area. 
In an effort to escape the persuasive effect of Potter, Evans suggests his 
reservation is more specific, conjecturing a length of 120 feet, equal to the Strip's 
width. (Aplee.'s Br. at 26 n.14, 29.) Evans presents no evidence, however, that 
the parties intended a straight-line path over the Strip, that the plain meaning of 
the reservation requires a straight path, or even that such a path was feasible when 
the easement was created. The easement language actually reserves a right of way 
"over and across" the Strip. (Aplt.'s Br. at 5.) This phrase could mean a diagonal 
line running from the northwest corner of the Strip to the southeast corner, or the 
reverse, or anything in between. It could begin anywhere along the northern 
boundary of the Strip and end anywhere along its southern boundary. Nothing in 
the reservation suggests a straight line, and any of these other paths would create 
an easement longer than the 120-foot width of the Strip. 
Looking again to Utah courts5 application of contract principles in the 
analogous context of deeds for guidance, it is clear that this degree of vagueness 
renders such conveyances unenforceable. As with easements, Utah law requires 
the boundaries of conveyed parcels to be described with sufficient specificity. 
See, e.g., Colman v. Butkovich, 556 P.2d 503, 505 (Utah 1976) ("It is not to be 
questioned that in order to be valid, the deed must contain a sufficiently definite 
description to identify the property it conveys." (footnote omitted)). "'In the 
construction of boundaries, we ... find that the intention of the parties is the 
controlling consideration.'" Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33, f28, 44 P.3d 781 
(quoting Losee v. Jones, 235 P.2d 132, 137 (Utah 1951)). This Court 
"determine[s] the parties' intent from the plain language of the four corners of the 
deed." Id. at %3S. 
In Ault, this Court held a boundary description that failed to close 
sufficiently specific after finding that several surveyors had been able to establish 
the parcel's boundaries based upon the deed's legal description. See id. at f^i|26-
27, 30. Yet, in Howard v. Howard, 367 P.2d 193 (Utah 1962), this Court affirmed 
a district court's nullification of a deed where the description of the parcel's 
boundaries not only failed to close, but provided no indication that closure from 
the last described call was even intended. See id. at 194-95. Consequently, this 
Court concluded that the only way to ascertain the grantor's intent was by 
conjecture, which could have led to "any number of areas." Id. at 195. 
Evans's easement resembles the situation in Howard. His reservation's 
failure to identify its points of beginning and ending, length, and path leave far 
more unknown than, in a deed context, an erroneously short call manifestly 
intended to close a parcel's boundary description. By suggesting, without 
evidence, that the length of his easement is 120 feet, Evans effectually illustrates 
that he must resort to conjecture in order to locate it, a concept explicitly rejected 
in Howard. 
II. EVANS'S INSUFFICIENT ATTEMPT TO RESERVE AN EXPRESS 
EASEMENT DID NOT CREATE A FLOATING OR ROVING 
EASEMENT. 
Evans argues that a reservation that fails to specify an easement's location 
or dimensions is an enforceable floating or roving easement. (Aplee.'s Br. at 14-
15.) He presents no controlling authority, however, that permits such an exception 
to the rules of construction outlined above. Moreover, construing Evans's 
easement as floating or roving contradicts the parties' intent as manifested by the 
reservation's plain language. 
(a) Floating easements are not exempt from the specificity 
requirements of express easements. 
Because the location and dimensions of an express easement are essential 
terms, Evans's argument that reservations lacking these terms are enforceable in 
Utah as floating or roving easements implies an exempt status. He points to two 
Utah cases for support: Wood v. Ashby, 253 P.2d 351 (Utah 1952), and Salt Lake 
City v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc. ("Walker"), 253 P.2d 365 (Utah 1953). (Aplee.'s 
Br. at 20-21.) Neither decision supports Evans's proposition. 
Evans decrees that "Wood refutes the County's position that an easement is 
void because its location is not specified in the deed" (Aplee.'s Br. at 22), yet he 
concedes that "[t]he issue in Wood was whether the easement should be assigned a 
reasonable location and boundaries or whether it was a general and unrestricted 
i o 
right of way covering the entire strip" (Aplee.'s Br. at 21). In other words, 
Evans agrees that the threshold issue of whether the reservation was void was not 
before the Court in Wood. Nothing in Wood hints that the issue was ever raised. 
In fact, the decision makes clear that the question was prompted by the 
defendants' use of part of the easement property for farming, not a dispute over 
whether it existed. See Wood, 253 P.2d at 353. Moreover, given the passage of at 
least thirty years from the original reservation to the initiation of the action, see id. 
at 352 (dating the original reservation sometime prior to 1917 and the suit 
sometime after 1947), it is entirely possible that the parties and the Court 
considered the question within the context of a prescriptive, rather than express, 
easement.13 See Potter, 1999 UT App 95, |17, 977 P.2d 533. 
To resolve the question of whether the reservation was unrestricted, the 
Court resorted to the doctrine of practical construction, see Wood, 253 P.2d at 
353-54, a tool of contract interpretation employed in Utah only after a court 
determines that an ambiguity exists. See, e.g., Webbank v. American Gen. Annuity 
Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88, f 19, 54 P.3d 1139 ("If a contract is ambiguous, the court 
may consider the parties' actions and performance as evidence of the parties' true 
intention."). That analysis is inapposite here, where the focus instead is on an 
12
 Though the meaning appears similar, the County prefers the Court's statement of 
the issue: "The issue is whether [the] deed reserved to the grantor a general and 
unrestricted right of way over strip A." Wood, 253 P.2d at 353. 
I T 
There exist many other reasons why the issue might not have been raised. It might 
have been in the parties' mutual interest to agree that the easement existed. It could 
also have been oversight. Regardless, the point remains that the easement's existence 
was not questioned. 
initial assessment of the reservation's enforceability. 
The incongruity between Evans's reliance on Wood and his criticism of the 
County's reliance on Potter further emphasizes his argument's weakness. While 
taking issue with the County's reliance on what he characterizes as Potter's dictum 
expressly holding a reservation void for failing to specify its location and 
dimensions (Aplee.'s Br. at 25-26), he simultaneously construes Wood's omission 
of "any suggestion that the easement might be void for lack of specificity" as 
supporting his conclusion that the lack of those terms does not render an easement 
unenforceable (Aplee.'s Br. at 21). Evans offers no explanation why Wood's 
silence should outweigh Potter's express holding. 
Although Evans correctly notes that the grant of easement at issue in Walker 
did not specifically fix its location or width (Aplee.'s Br. at 22), he misinterprets 
the County's argument by concluding that the County would consider the 
easement void. (Aplee.'s Br. at 23.) The Court in Walker did not, as Evans 
suggests, uphold "a floating easement with inadequately defined terms." (Aplee.'s 
Br. at 22.) The easement at issue in Walker was instead a sufficiently specific 
floating easement. It granted "'a right of way and easement for all... conduits ... to 
be constructed by the City wherever these may be located now or hereafter within 
lands owned by' the grantor." Walker, 253 P.2d at 238 (quoting grant) (emphases 
omitted). It therefore sufficiently specified a method by which the parties were to 
determine the dimensions and location of the granted easement, an acceptable 
construction under Utah contract law. (Aplt.'s Br. at 12-13.) 
As specified in the grant, the city subsequently chose a location for the 
water conduit, constructed it, and began operation in 1906. See Walker, 253 P.2d 
at 368. Thus, the existence of the easement was not at issue. In fact, as with 
Wood, there is no indication that the parties made any argument that the easement 
itself was void. Rather, the question raised was the extent of the implied 
secondary easement for operation, repair, and maintenance of the conduit that the 
city claimed was threatened by the defendant's excavation activities years later.14 
See id. at 366-68. It is this secondary easement that the Court interprets as "of 
such width as is reasonably necessary for full enjoyment of the easement granted." 
Walker, 253 P.2d at 369. See also Conley v. Whittlesey, 985 P.2d 1127, 1133 n.l 
(Idaho 1999) ("The term 'secondary easement' is applied to the right to enter and 
repair and do those things necessary to the full enjoyment of the easement 
existing."). Thus, Walker's determination of the extent of this incidental easement 
does not suggest Evans's conclusion that Utah courts recognize and locate failed 
attempts to create fixed easements. 
Because neither Wood nor Walker excuse floating or roving easements from 
the requirement imposed by Utah contract law that the dimensions and location of 
express easements be sufficiently specified, the failure of Evans's reservation to 
sufficiently specify these essential terms renders it void, regardless whether it 
otherwise would be considered a floating or roving easement. 
(b) Floating easements are created when intended by the parties. 
Assuming, arguendo, that Evans's reservation sufficiently specified its 
dimensions and location, it still would not constitute a floating or roving easement 
because it is clear from its language that the parties did not intend to create one. 
Evans correctly notes that "[t]he paramount rule of construction of deeds is to give 
effect to the intent of the parties as expressed in the deed as a whole, ...." 
Hancock v. Planned Dev. Corp., 791 P.2d 183, 185 (Utah 1990); (Aplee.'s Br. at 
20). Yet, he abandons that well-established precept by labeling the County's 
14
 "'The right to enter upon the servient tenement for the purpose of repairing or 
renewing an artificial structure, constituting an easement, is called a 'secondary 
easement,' a mere incident of the easement that passes by express or implied grant, or 
is acquired by prescription.'" Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Webb, 84 S.E. 2d 735, 
739 (Va. 1954) (quoting 2 Thompson, Real Property (Perm. Ed.), § 676, p.343). 
argument that floating easements are created only when intended as "novel" 
(Aplee.'s Br. at 13), and asserting that all that is required to create a floating 
easement is "that the location and/or dimensions of the easement be inadequately 
defined" (Aplee.'s Br. at 14). This inconsistency results from Evans's overbroad 
definition of floating easements. 
Evans criticizes the County's reliance on Flying Diamond Oil Corp. v. 
Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618 (Utah 1989), to support its argument that a 
floating easement is created when the parties intend then-unpredictable 
circumstances to fix the easement's dimensions and location by dismissing the 
decision's language as tangential dictum strictly limited to the facts of the case. 
(Aplee.'s Br. at 23-24.) Regardless its status, Flying Diamond's description of 
the easements at issue in that case as floating, and explaining that they were 
defined by unpredictable circumstances, see Flying Diamond, 776 P.2d at 626, 
offers persuasive support for the County's interpretation. Moreover, the similarity 
tying together the floating easements at issue in Flying Diamond and Walker is the 
parties' clear intent to allow the unpredictable circumstances specified in the 
creating instruments to set the easements' boundaries and locations. In Walker, it 
was the city's subsequent location and construction of a water conduit. See 
Walker, 253 P.2d at 368. In Flying Diamond, it was the location of wells, roads, 
and other facilities to locate, remove, and transport oil or gas. See Flying 
Diamond, 116 P.2d at 626. Hence, in both Walker and Flying Diamond the parties 
intended the dimensions and location of the easements to remain undefined until 
they were fixed by the mechanisms identified in the creating instruments. 
In contrast, Evans's easement clearly demonstrates the parties' intent to 
reserve a fixed, not floating, easement. The reservation language does not tie the 
location or dimensions of the contemplated easement to the eventual location of 
any structures, the discovery of mineral deposits, or anything similar. Rather, the 
language clearly indicates an intent to reserve "a 56 foot wide right-of-way over 
and across" the Strip. (Aplt.'s Br. at 5.) Therefore, giving effect to the parties' 
intent as manifested in the reservation militates against a finding of a floating 
easement here. 
The impossibility of using any of the four Walker factors the court of 
appeals instructed the district court to employ on remand to set Evans's 
easement's dimensions and location, see Evans, 2004 UT App 256, f22, 97 P.3d 
697, also illustrates that it is not a floating easement. Walker outlined four 
methods to fix floating easements: (1) agreement of the parties; (2) acquiescent 
use; (3) right of selection as specified in the grant; or (4) necessity. See Walker, 
253 P.2d at 368. First, the parties do not agree where the easement should be 
located. See Evans, 2004 UT App 256, \6, 97 P.3d 697 (noting the end of 
unfruitful settlement discussions). Second, there has been no acquiescent use. 
(Aplt.'s Br. at 2-3.) Third, the reservation does not vest a right of selection in 
either party. It requires the County to build a road over it, but does not give it the 
right to locate it. (Aplt.'s Br. at 5.) Finally, Evans has never claimed that the 
easement must be located in a particular place "because any other place would 
annul, ruin, or militate against the grant." Walker, 253 P.2d at 368. Indeed, 
Evans's statement that he "has no objection to the County selecting a reasonable 
location on the Strip for placement of the Easement" (Aplee.'s Br. at 30) would 
contradict such an assertion. 
Additionally, none of the four Walker methods for fixing a floating 
easement's location fit within "the course [Evans contends] this Court should 
mandate on remand." (Aplee.'s Br. at 31.) According to Evans, this Court should 
order the district court to allow the County to select a location for the easement 
within a reasonable time. Failing that, Evans would get to choose his easement's 
location. Finally, if the parties could not agree, the district court would locate the 
easement using the standard for the extent of secondary easements. (Aplee.'s Br. 
at 30-31.) This approach, however, does not rely on agreement by the parties, 
acquiescent use, a right of selection vested by the grant, or the requirement of 
necessity as defined in Walker. Thus, Evans's proposition actually diverges from 
the instructions of the court of appeals. Because Evans has filed no cross-appeal, 
his request is improper. 
Evans's references to The Law of Easements, Corpus Juris Secundum, and 
Black's Law Dictionary for definitions of floating easements are inapposite. 
(Aplee.'s Br. at 12.) Summarized, they all state that undesignated grants of rights 
of way may be termed floating easements. These definitions fit both Evans's and 
the County's interpretations. Moreover, a review of the case law upon which 
Evans relies tends to support the County's interpretation. 
In Los Angeles v. Howard, 53 Cal. Rptr. 274 (Cal. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966), 
and the cases listed in footnote six of Evans's brief (most of which also appear in a 
footnote in The Law of Easements, see Bruce & Ely, supra, § 7:4 n.l), the term 
was used the same way the County argues it has been used in Utah case law: The 
parties intended to create an easement, the dimensions and location of which were 
to be determined by a prescribed method, usually subject to unpredictable 
circumstances. See Howard, 53 Cal. Rptr. 274, 276 (discussing a reservation 
granting the city an easement "'for the purpose of operating, maintaining, 
repairing and renewing [pjower lines for the conveyance of electricity'" (quoting 
instrument)); Sunnyside Valley Irrigation Dist. v. Dickie, 73 P.3d 369, 370 (Wash. 
2003) (regarding a grant of right of way to maintain irrigation laterals); Coughlin 
v. Anderson, 853 A.2d 460, 464 (Conn. 2004) (addressing an exception and grant 
"to install water, sewerage, gas and electrical conduits" over the property); 
Edgcomb v. Lower Valley Power and Light, Inc., 922 P.2d 850, 853 (Wyo. 1996) 
(analyzing an easement for constructing, operating, and maintaining electric 
lines)1:>; New Orleans & Northeastern R.R. v. Morrison, 35 So. 2d 68, 69 (Miss. 
1948) (reserving the use of land and timber on either side of the road "to be 
constructed by" the railroad company); Scherger v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 
575 N.W. 2d 578, 579 (Minn. 1998) (involving an easement over the property 
with rights of ingress and egress to construct and maintain gas pipelines); Missouri 
Pub. Serv. Co. v. Argenbright, 457 S.W. 2d 777, 780 (Mo. 1970) (addressing an 
easement sought by eminent domain to locate, construct, operate, and maintain 
electric transmission wires). 
In the only case Evans cites that presents a situation arguably similar to one 
where the parties simply failed to specify an intended fixed easement, the court 
found that the floating easement was valid because, unlike Evans's reservation, it 
set forth one of the Walker methods for determining its location. See Umberger v. 
Department of Game, Fish and Parks, 248 N.W. 2d 359, 397 (S.D. 1976) ("The 
easement itself anticipated mutual agreement in establishing a more exact route, 
...." (emphasis added)). 
In Village of Wagon Mound v. Mora Trust, 62 P.3d 1255 (N.M. Ct. App. 
2002), cited by Evans (Aplee.'s Br. at 13 n.6), the New Mexico Court of Appeals 
endorsed a narrow definition of a floating easement similar to that used by this 
Court in Walker and Flying Diamond. In Wagon Mound, the grant provided an 
easement for waterworks across particularly described land "'as said works, water 
intake and pipe line may be located by the engineers'" of the village. Wagon 
Mound, 62 P.3d at 1265 (quoting indenture). After locating the pipeline, the grant 
provided that the grantor would execute and deliver another deed conveying the 
rights of way by definite description. However, although the pipeline was built, 
the deed with definite descriptions was never delivered. See id. at 1265. 
1:>
 The court concluded, in part, that "the parties intended a floating easement at the 
time the easement was executed." Id. at 855 (emphasis added). 
Concluding that the parties' intent was "undisputed," the court found "no conflict 
with prior case law or New Mexico policy in recognizing the validity of an 
undescribed, or 'floating' easement in these circumstances." Id. at 1266. "[T]hese 
circumstances" being the creation of an easement to be located by one of the 
parties via its construction a water pipeline, much as in the case of Walker. In 
other words, the parties' clear intent to create a floating easement, and the 
inclusion of a method for fixing it in the creating instrument, allowed the court to 
recognize an enforceable floating easement. 
Moreover, Bruce and Ely's treatise also notes that floating easements 
"burden the entire servient estate and therefore tend to hamper development, limit 
financing possibilities, and impede alienation of the property." Bruce & Ely, 
supra, § 7:7 (footnote omitted). Since, in Utah, "[t]he accepted rule is that... the 
easement conveyed should be so construed as to burden the servient estate only to 
the degree necessary to satisfy the purpose described in the grant," Weggeland v. 
Ujifusa, 384 P.2d 590, 591 (Utah 1963) (footnote omitted), the presumption 
should be that the parties did not intend to create such a burden. 
III. MAINTAINING A CONSISTENT APPROACH TO INTERPRETING 
CONVEYANCES AND A STRICT DEFINITION OF FLOATING OR 
ROVING EASEMENTS PROMOTES CLARITY AND JUDICIAL 
ECONOMY. 
Evans argues that his suggestion for placing the easement in question 
(which, as noted above, contradicts the court of appeals's order) "is the only 
course that makes sense and does not lead to serious inequities" because he 
"purchased his property with the reasonable expectation that the Easement was 
valid, and his development plans have long depended on that expectation." He 
further asserts that "[vjoiding the Easement, as the County now advocates, would 
impose an economic hardship on [him]." (Aplee.'s Br. at 31.) Evans offers no 
support from the record for these claims of detrimental effect or reliance, which 
seem at least questionable given that the original conveyance from his predecessor 
made no mention of the reservation until the corrected quitclaim deed was filed 
over five years later. (R. at 300-298, 411-10.) 
The prejudice to the courts and the parties to such insufficiently described 
easements that would result from adopting Evans's proposed rules of 
interpretation is clear and well established. Both The Law of Easements and Utah 
Real Property Law direct their readers to define carefully the dimensions and 
locations of express easements. See Bruce & Ely, supra, § 7:1 ("When an 
easement is created by express provision, the drafters should take care to specify 
precisely the location and dimensions of the easement." (footnote omitted)); 
Thomas & Backman, supra, § 12.02(b)(1) ("To avoid future litigation the 
draftsman must use great care to identify clearly and specifically: ... the limits, 
permitted uses and duration of the easement." (footnote omitted)). The advice is 
given to avoid what both authorities describe as frequent litigation on these 
matters. Evans also acknowledges this problem and its drain on judicial resources, 
noting that "[h]ow to fix the location or dimensions of an inadequately described 
easement is a recurring question that often 'taxes the best resources of judicial 
ingenuity.'" (Aplee.'s Br. at 16 (quoting Daniel v. Clarkson, 338 S.W. 2d 691, 
692 (Ky. I960)).) See also Bruce & Ely, supra, § 7:6. 
Nevertheless, apart from personal benefit, Evans offers no explanation why 
Utah's courts should discard the requirement that the creation of an express 
easement requires a sufficiently specific description of its dimensions and 
location, or depart from a limited definition of floating easements. In the absence 
of a compelling rationale for diverging from Utah precedent by endorsing 
ambiguity and thereby increasing judicial involvement in these matters, the Court 
should maintain these clear guidelines. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Evans's express easement is not sufficiently 
specific to be enforceable, nor would it constitute a floating or roving easement if 
it were. Consequently, Evans's reservation is void, and the decision of the court 
of appeals should be reversed. 
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§ 7:16 —Specia l cases of re locat ion a b s e n t m u t u a l consen t 
§ 7:17 C h a n g e in d imens ions 
§ 7:1 Introduction 
Research References 
West's Key Number Digest, Easements ®=>46 
Once an easement has been created, difficulties often ar ise 
with respect to its location and dimensions. The mode of creation 
bears on the resolution of these issues.1 For example, if the ease-
ment was expressly created by grant or reservation, implied from 
a plat, or formally condemned, the part ies and the courts may 
look to a written easement description for guidance.2 If, however, 
the easement arose by implication from a quasi-easement or by 
prescription, no writing exists, but prior use serves as a s tar t ing 
point for analysis.3 Furthermore, if the easement is one of neces-
sity, neither a written document nor, typically, prior use exists to 
facilitate interpreting the scope of the easement.4 
When an easement is created by express provision, the drafters 
should take care to specify precisely the location and dimensions 
of the easement.5 Too frequently, easement drafters fail to cover 
one or more of these matters , or they treat location and dimen-
sion issues in an incomplete or ambiguous fashion.6 
§ 7:2 Location and d imens ions of express e a s e m e n t s 
Research References 
West's Key Number Digest, Easements <3=*46 
Drafters of express easements should include a legal descrip-
[Sect ion 7:1] 
1See Wright v. Horse Creek Ranches, 697 P.2d 384, 388 (Colo. 1985); 3 R. 
Powell, Powell on Real Property § 34.12 (1994). 
2See 3 R Powell, Powell on Real Property § 34 12 (1994) For t reatment of 
the specialized problem of condemning land on which to locate electric power 
lines, see Eminent Domain: Review of Electric Power Company's Location of 
Transmission Line For Which Condemnation is Sought, 19 A.L.R. 4th 1026. 
3See 3 R. Powell, Powell on Real Property §§ 34.12, 34.13 (1994). 
4Seeid. a t §34.13. 
5Cunningham, Stoebuck, and Whitman, The Law of Property (2d ed.) § 8.9; 
see generally Kratovil, Easement Draftsmanship and Conveyancing, 38 Cal. L. 
Rev. 426 (1950), Extent and Reasonableness of Use of Private Way in Exercise 
of Easement Granted in General Terms, 3 A.L.R. 3d 1256 (making drafting 
suggestions). For a "Model Easement Grant ," see Kratovil and Werner, Real 
Estate Law 24-25 (9th ed ) 
6Cunningham, Stoebuck, and Whitman, The Law of Property (2d ed ) § 8.9. 
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tion of both the servient tenement and the precise portion of that 
tract over which the easement runs.1 Although the instrument 
must identify the servient estate, failure to indicate the ease-
ment's dimensions or its location on the servient property usually 
is not fatal to the contemplated servitude.2 The generally ac-
cepted view is that extrinsic evidence may be used to identify the 
location and dimensions of the easement.3 The easement dimen-
sion that causes the most difficulty is width, but controversy as to 
height or depth frequently arises indirectly in connection with 
what constitutes reasonable use of a general right-of-way.4 
[Section 7:2] 
^ a z e n , Easements From the Viewpoint of the Title Insurer, 15 Gal. St. BJ 
28, 31 (1940). For a "Model Easement Grant / ' see Kratovil and Werner, Real 
Esta te Law 24-25 (9th ed.). See generally §3:1 (discussing requirements of 
Statute of Frauds and noting that document creating easement must identify 
servient tenement). 
2Harvey v. Bell, 292 Ark. 657, 660, 732 S.W.2d 138, 140 (1987); Howard v. 
Cramlet, 56 Ark. App. 171, 174-175, 939 S.W.2d 858, 859-860 (1997); Colvin v. 
Southern Cal. Edison Co., 194 Cal. App. 3d 1306, 1312, 240 Cal. Rptr. 142, 146 
(2d Dist. 1987) (abrogated on other grounds, by Grnelas v. Randolph, 4 Cal. 4th 
1095, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594, 847 P.2d 560 (1993)); Hynes v. City of Lakeland, 451 
So. 2d 505, 511 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1984); Murdock v. Ward, 267 Ga. 
303, 303-304, 477 S.E.2d 835, 836 (1996); Joseph Giddan & Sons v. Northbrook 
Trust & Sav. Bank, 151 111. App. 3d 537, 541, 103 111. Dec. 440, 501 N.E.2d 757, 
760 (1st Dist. 1986); Cheever v. Graves, 32 Mass. App. Ct. 601, 605, 592 N.E.2d 
758, 761 (1992); Hall v. Allen, 771 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. 1989); Hoeischer v. 
Simmerock, 921 S.W.2d 676, 679 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1996); Clements v. 
Schultz, 200 A.D.2d 11, 13-14, 612 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727-728 (4th Dep't 1994); 
Jones v. Fuller, 856 S.W.2d 597, 602 (Tex. App. Waco 1993); Wilheim v. 
Beyersdorf, 100 Wash. App. 836, 844, 999 P.2d 54, 59 (Div. 3 2000); Berg v. 
Ting, 68 Wash. App. 721, 727-730, 850 P.2d 1349, 1353-1355 (Div. 1 1993), 
rev'd on other grounds, 125 Wash. 2d 544, 886 P.2d 564 (1995) ("[T]he location 
of an easement, which need not be precisely described, is to be distinguished 
from the location of the servient estate, which must be accurately described" 
(emphasis in original)); see also § 3:1 (discussing application of Statute of Frauds 
to creation of express easements). But see Mueller v. Hoblyn, 887 P.2d 500, 505, 
62 A.L.R.5th 847 (Wyo. 1994) ("Presently, Wyoming law requires specific 
descriptions for easements recorded after May 20, 1981/'); Wyo. Stat. § 34-1-141 
(easement created without specific location is void unless description of location 
is recorded within one year of execution of easement). 
3See sources cited in § 7:6, note 3. 
4See § 8:4 (discussing propriety of placing utility poles or underground utili-
ties on general right-of-way); see also Wright & Hester, Pipes, Wires, and 
Bicycles: Rails-to-Trails, Utility Licenses, and the Shifting Scope of Railroad 
Easements From the Nineteenth to the Twenty-First Centuries, 27 Ecology LQ 
351, 414, 415 (2000) (citing this treatise in connection with discussion of scope 
of railroad easements). 
d
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§ 7:3 —Easements not subject to prec ise locat ion 
Research References 
West's Key Number Digest, Easements <3^ 46 
Certain servitudes cannot be located with precision. Easements 
or profits for h u n t i n g and fishing or for o ther recrea t ional 
purposes often entitle the holder to use the entire servient estate 
and thus defy pinpoint description.1 Such relatively indefinite 
servitudes are regularly enforced,2 apparently on the ground that 
the parties' clear intent should be given effect. In such cases, the 
owner of the servient estate is protected by the general principle 
tha t an easement holder cannot utilize the easement in an un-
reasonable manner.3 
§ 7:4 —Location or d imens ions omit ted or inadequate ly 
described 
Research References 
West's Key Number Digest, Easements <§=>46 
Express easements tha t omit or inadequately describe the loca-
t ion or d imens ions of t he ea semen t a re commonplace. For 
example, the ins t rument creating the easement may provide for 
the following: 
1. "A right of way fifteen feet wide over X s farm"; 
[Sec t ion 7:3] 
1Bachman v. Hecht, 659 F. Supp. 308, 316-317 (D.V.I. 1986) (beach ease-
ment over entire parcels), judgment affd, 849 F.2d 599 (3d Cir. 1988) and judg-
ment affd, 849 F.2d 601 (3d Cir. 1988); Cunningham, Stoebuck, and Whitman, 
The Law of Property (2d ed.) § 8.1; see also Bruce v. Garges, 259 Ga. 268, 270-
272, 379 S.E.2d 783, 785 (1989) (recreational easement to dry sand a rea of 
beach); Drye v. Eagle Rock Ranch, Inc., 364 S.W.2d 196, 211-212 (Tex. 1962). 
Hunting and fishing rights frequently are considered profits and enforced 
as such. E.g., Hanson v. Fergus Falls Nat. Bank, 242 Minn. 498, 501-510, 65 
N.W.2d 857, 860-865, 49 A.L.R.2d 1379 (1954); High v. Davis, 283 Qr. 315, 322, 
584 P.2d 725, 730 (1978); Fairbrother v. Adams, 135 Vt. 428, 430-431, 378 A.2d 
102, 104 (1977). See generally § 1:12 (discussing hunting and fishing profits). 
2E.g., U.S. v. 126.24 Acres of Land, More or Less, S i tua te in St. Clair 
County, S ta te of Mo., 572 F . Supp. 832, 834 (W.D. Mo. 1983); Bachman v. 
Hecht, 659 F. Supp. 308, 316-317 (D.V.I. 1986), judgment affd, 849 F.2d 599 
(3d Cir. 1988) and judgment affd, 849 F.2d 601 (3d Cir. 1988); see also Mikesh 
v. Peters, 284 N.W.2d 215, 217-219 (Iowa 1979); Cunningham, Stoebuck, and 
Whitman, The Law of Property (2d ed.) § 8.1. 
3See § 8:10 (analyzing l imitations on holder's use of easement) ; see also 
Note, Property Owners Beware: The Minnesota Supreme Court Has Twice 
"Misconstrued" Express Easements, 25 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1545, 1572 n.225, 
1573 n.230 (1999) (citing and quoting this treatise). 
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2. "A sewer line along the northern boundary of Lot 17"; or 
3. "A pipeline easement across F s ranch." 
Questions then arise as to the location of the easement (example 
1), its dimensions (example 2), or both its location and dimen-
sions (example 3). Unlocated easements (examples 1 and 3) are 
often called floating easements.1 
The Supreme Court of Arkansas has identified an unusual type 
of floating easement.2 The court concluded that a "mail patron 
has a floating easement for the placement of a mailbox in the 
right-of-way dedicated for 'public use/"3 A mail patron, however, 
cannot put a mailbox wherever the patron wishes on the servient 
estate.4 
§ 7:5 Des ignat ion by parties 
Research References 
West's Key Number Digest, Easements <s=>46, 48(2) 
Sometimes the easement instrument expressly provides tha t 
one of the parties has the right to select the location and dimen-
[Sect ion 7:4] 
1
"A 'floating easement' . . . is an easement . . . which, when created, is not 
limited to any specific area on the servient tenement . . .". City of Los Angeles 
v. Howard, 244 Cal. App. 2d 538, 541 n. l , 53 Cal. Rptr. 274, 276 n . l (2d Dist. 
1966). See also Norris v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Works, 261 Cal. App. 2d 
41, 48 n.4, 67 C a l Rptr. 595, 599 n.4 (3d Dist. 1968); Umberger v. State ex rel. 
Dept. of Game, Fish and Parks, 248 N.W.2d 395, 397 (S.D. 1976); R.C.R., Inc. v. 
Rainbow Canyon, Inc., 978 P.2d 581, 587 (Wyo. 1999) (citing this treatise); Edg-
comb v. Lower Valley Power and Light, Inc., 922 P.2d 850, 855 (Wyo. 1996) ("An 
express easement not stat ing the location and dimensions is called a floating 
easement. . . ."); Hazen, Easements From the Viewpoint of the Title Insurer, 15 
Cal. St. BJ 28, 32 (1940); Note, Real Property: The Effect of Floating Easements 
Held by Pipeline Companies on Marketability of Title and Land Values, 37 
Okla. L. Rev. 180, 180 (1984). 
Floating easements are also sometimes termed "blanket easements" or 
"roving easements." See Scherger v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 575 N.W.2d 
578, 579 (Minn. 1998) ("blanket easement"); Missouri Public Service Co. v. 
Argenbright, 457 S.W.2d 777, 780-783 (Mo. 1970) ("blanket easement"); Salt 
Lake City v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 123 Utah 1, 8, 253 P.2d 365, 368 (1953) 
("roving easement"); Note, Real Property: The Effect of Floating Easements 
Held by Pipeline Companies on Marketability of Title and Land Values, 37 
Okla. L. Rev. 180, 180 (1984) (mentioning alternative term "blanket easement"). 
2Lawson v. Sipple, 319 Ark. 543, 551-554, 893 S.W.2d 757, 761-762 (1995). 
3Id. at 552, 893 S.W.2d at 761-762. 
4Id. at 552-554, 893 S.W.2d at 761-762. See § 7:5 (discussing designation by 
parties of location of floating easement). 
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sions of an undescribed easement.1 In such cases, the party hold-
ing the right to select must act reasonably, taking into consider-
ation the needs of the easement holder or the burden imposed on 
the servient es ta te , as the case may be.2 The selection of the 
easement 's location and dimensions need not be in writing; it 
may be accomplished orally or by use.3 Notwithstanding this gen-
eral principle, one court, citing public policy considerations, such 
as safety, required a natural gas pipeline easement holder to rec-
ord notice of the location it selected pursuan t to the easement 
instrument.4 
More commonly, the instrument is silent regarding the manner 
by which the location and dimensions of an undescribed ease-
ment should be determined. Many jurisdictions take a practical 
approach to this problem. In these states, the owner of the servi-
ent estate is entitled to designate a reasonable location for the 
easement.5 If the servient estate owner fails to make such a 
designation within a reasonable period, the easement holder may 
TSection 7:5] 
1E.g., Sorrell v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 314 S.W.2d 193, 194 (Ky. 
1958) (easement holder had right to select routes for gas pipelines); Larson v. 
Amundson, 414 N.W.2d 413, 415-417 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (easement over 
"road to be laid out" by servient estate owner); Marlow v. Mariow, 284 S.C. 155, 
160, 325 S.E.2d 703, 706 (Ct. App. 1984) (discretion in servient estate owner to 
designate location and width of access road) (disapproved of on other grounds, 
by Jowers v. Hornsby, 292 S.C. 549, 357 S.E.2d 710 (1987)); Smith v. King, 27 
Wash. App. 869, 870-871, 620 P.2d 542, 543, 24 A.L.R.4th 1049 (Div. 1 1980) 
(right in easement holder to select location of road); Clearwater Realty Co. v. 
Bouchard, 146 Vt. 359, 361-362, 505 A.2d 1189, 1190-1191 (1985) (owner of 
servient estate had right to designate width and location of way). 
2See Texas Eas tern Transmission Corp. v. Carman, 314 S.W.2d 684, 687 
(Ky. 1958) (selection of location by easement holder); Marlow v. Marlow, 284 
S.C. 155, 160, 325 S.E.2d 703, 706 (Ct. App. 1984) (selection of location by servi-
ent estate owner) (disapproved of on other grounds, by Jowers v. Hornsby, 292 
S.C. 549, 357 S.E.2d 710 (1987)). 
3Smith v. King, 27 Wash. App. 869, 871, 620 P.2d 542, 543, 24 A.L.R.4th 
1049 (Div. 1 1980) ("A deed is not required to establish the actual location of an 
easement, but is required to convey an easement . . . " (emphasis in original)); 
see also Location of Easement of Way Created by Grant Which Does Not Specify 
Location, 24 A.L.R. 4th 1053, 1064-1065. 
4McArthur v. East Tennessee Natural Gas Co., 813 S.W.2d 417, 420 (Tenn. 
1991). 
5Arkansas Val. Elec. Co-op. Corp. v. Brinks, 240 Ark. 381, 383, 400 S.W.2d 
278, 279 (1966); Howard v. Cramlet, 56 Ark. App. 171, 174-175, 939 S.W.2d 
858, 859-860 (1997); Ballard v. Titus, 157 Cal. 673, 683, 110 P. 118, 122 (1910); 
Daniel v. Clarkson, 338 S.W.2d 691, 692-693 (Ky. 1960); Bethel v. Van Stone, 
120 Idaho 522, 527-528, 817 P.2d 188, 193-194 (Ct. App. 1991); Larson v. 
Amundson, 414 N.W.2d 413, 417 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Graves v. Gerber, 208 
Neb. 209, 214, 302 N.W.2d 717, 720 (1981); Sussex Rural Elec. Co-op. v. Want-
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select a reasonable route.6 If the parties are unable to reach an 
agreement, a court may specify a location for the easement.7 
§ 7:6 Designat ion by court 
Research References 
West's Key Number Digest, Easements <^46y 61 
Parties frequently disagree over the location and dimensions of 
an express easement. Consequently, the description issue is often 
litigated. The initial point of inquiry is to determine whether the 
instrument creating the easement adequately locates the ease-
ment and describes its dimensions.1 When interpreting express 
easements , courts usually s t a r t with the proposition tha t the 
age Tp., 217 N.J. Super. 481, 490, 526 A.2d 259, 263-264 (App. Div. 1987); Po-
mygalski v. Eagle Lake Farms, Inc., 192 A.D.2d 810, 811, 596 N.Y.S.2d 535, 537 
(3d Dep't 1993); Abdalla v. State Highway Commission, 261 N.C. 114, 119, 134 
S.E.2d 81, 85 (1964); McConnell v. Golden, 104 R.I. 657, 663, 247 A.2d 909, 912 
(1968); Smith v. Commissioners of Public Works of City of Charleston, 312 S.C. 
460, 469, 441 S.E.2d 331, 337 (Ct. App. 1994); Patch v. Baird, 140 Vt. 60, 66, 
435 A.2d 690, 691-692 (1981); R.C.R., Inc. v. Rainbow Canyon, Inc., 978 P.2d 
581, 588 (Wyo. 1999) (citing this treatise); Location of Easement of Way Created 
by Grant Which Does Not Specify Location, 24 A.L.R. 4th 1053. See also Law-
son v. Sipple, 319 Ark. 543, 553-554, 893 S.W.2d 757, 762 (1995) (location of 
floating easement for mailbox must be reasonable and is subject to servient 
estate owner's "right to delimit"). But see Colvin v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 
194 Cal. App. 3d 1306, 1312, 240 Cal. Rptr. 142, 146 (2d Dist. 1987) (easement 
holder has right to select reasonable location on servient estate for unlocated 
easement) (abrogated on other grounds, by Ornelas v. Randolph, 4 Cal. 4th 
1095, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594, 847 P.2d 560 (1993)). 
6See sources cited supra note 5. 
7Bethel v. Van Stone, 120 Idaho 522, 527-528, 817 R2d 188, 193-194 (Ct. 
App. 1991); Maddox v. Katzman, 332 N.W.2d 347, 352 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982); 
Daniel v. Clarkson, 338 S.W.2d 691, 693 (Ky. 1960); Graves v. Gerber, 208 Neb. 
209, 214, 302 N.W.2d 717, 720 (1981). 
[Sect ion 7:6] 
1For cases in which the express easement description was found adequate, 
see Consolidated Amusement Co., Ltd. v. Waikiki Business Plaza, Inc., 6 Haw. 
App. 312, 317, 719 P.2d 1119, 1123 (1986); Lindhorst v. Wright, 1980 OK CIV 
APP 42, 616 P.2d 450, 454 (Okla. Ct. App. Div. 1 1980) ("The language in the 
deed is clear. It granted 'a perpetual right of ingress and egress on and across 
the easterly 40 feet of the SW/4 of. . . Section 14/ . . . This description is defi-
nite and admits of no ambiguity." (emphasis in original)); Salmon v. Bradshaw, 
84 S.D. 500, 505, 173 N.W.2d 281, 284 (1969); Semler v. Hartley, 184 W. Va. 24, 
399 S.E.2d 54, 56-57 (1990) (finding no ambiguity in grant regarding width of 
easement and reversing judgment based on extrinsic evidence). See generally 
Edgcomb v. Lower Valley Power and Light, Inc., 922 P.2d 850, 854-855 (Wyo. 
1996) (quoting extensively from this section of this treatise). 
e
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terms of the written instrument control.2 If the terms of descrip-
tion are inadequate or nonexistent, then extrinsic evidence gen-
erally may be considered to ascertain the intent of the parties as 
to the location and dimensions of the easement.3 The parties are 
presumed to have intended an easement that is reasonably con-
venient or necessary under the circumstances.4 As the Supreme 
2Andersen v. Edwards, 625 P.2d 282, 286 (Alaska 1981); Kotick v. Durrant , 
143 Fla. 386, 392, 196 So. 802, 805 (1940); Consolidated Amusement Co., Ltd. v. 
Waikiki Business Plaza, Inc., 6 Haw. App. 312, 317, 719 P.2d 1119, 1123 (1986); 
Aladdin Petroleum Corp. v. Gold Crown Properties, Inc., 221 Kan. 579, 584, 561 
P.2d 818, 822-823 (1977); Munchmeyer v. Burfield, 1996 WL 142579, a t *3 
(Ohio Ct. App. 4th Dist. Washington County 1996) (citing this treatise); Lind-
horst v. Wright, 1980 OK CIV APP 42, 616 P.2d 450, 453 (Okla. Ct. App. Div. 1 
1980); Salmon v. Bradshaw, 84 S.D. 500, 505-506, 173 N.W.2d 281, 284 (1969). 
3See Lazy Dog Ranch v. Telluray Ranch Corp., 965 P.2d 1229, 1235-1237 
(Colo. 1998); Wulf v. Tibaldo, 680 P.2d 1348, 1350 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984); Hynes 
v. City of Lakeland, 451 So. 2d 505, 511 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1984); Val-
las v. Johnson, 72 111. App. 3d 281, 284, 28 111. Dec. 580, 390 N.E.2d 939, 942 (3d 
Dist. 1979); Anchors v. Manter, 1998 ME 152, 714 A.2d 134, 140 (Me. 1998); 
Highway 7 Embers , Inc. v. Nor thwestern Nat . Bank, 256 N.W.2d 271, 277 
(Minn. 1977); Hoelscher v. Simmerock, 921 S.W.2d 676, 679 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 
1996); Tanner v. Dream Island, Inc., 275 Mont. 414, 422, 913 P.2d 641, 646 
(1996) (circumstantial evidence used to identify roads noted in 1932 deeds); 
Barton's Motel, Inc. v. Saymore Trophy Co., Inc., 113 N.H. 333, 335, 306 A.2d 
774, 775-776 (1973); Briggs v. Di Donna, 176 A.D.2d 1105, 1106-1107, 575 N.Y. 
S.2d 407, 408-409 (3d Dep't 1991); Tipperman v. Tsiatsos, 140 Or. App. 282, 
286, 915 P.2d 446, 449 (1996), review allowed, 324 Or. 176, 922 P.2d 669 (1996) 
and decision affd in part and modified on other grounds, 327 Or. 539, 964 P.2d 
1015 (1998); Sacco v. Narraganset t Elec. Co., 505 A.2d 1153, 1155-1156 (R.I. 
1986) ("The easement created was described only as 'a certain way or drive 
along the Easterly line of [the grantees'] t rac t / Therefore, the court properly 
considered extrinsic evidence in order to ascertain the par t ies ' intention."); 
Moore v. Reynolds, 285 S.C. 574, 578-579, 330 S.E.2d 542, 545 (Ct. App. 1985); 
Morse v. Murphy, 157 Vt. 410, 411-412, 599 A.2d 1367, 1367-1368 (1991) 
(concluding ambigui ty deba tab le and finding extr ins ic evidence properly 
considered); Waskey v. Lewis, 224 Va. 206, 211, 294 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1982); 
R.C.R., Inc. v. Rainbow Canyon, Inc., 978 P.2d 581, 586 (Wyo. 1999) (citing this 
t reat ise); Location of Easement of Way Created by Gran t Which Does Not 
Specify Location, 24 A.L.R. 4th 1053. But see Mueller v. Hoblyn, 887 R2d 500, 
505, 62 A.L.R.5th 847 (Wyo. 1994) ("Presently, Wyoming law requires specific 
descriptions for easements recorded after May 20, 1981."); Wyo. Stat. § 34-1-141 
(easement created without specific location is void unless description of location 
is recorded within one year of execution of easement). 
4Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Savage, 863 F. Supp. 198, 201-202, 
131 O.G.R. 365 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (fifty-foot width found reasonable under circum-
stances); Barton's Motel, Inc. v. Saymore Trophy Co., Inc., 113 N.H. 333, 335, 
306 A.2d 774, 776 (1973); Oliphant v. McCarthy, 208 A.D.2d 1079, 1080, 617 
N.Y.S.2d 555, 557 (3d Dep't 1994) ("The express grant, however, does not specify 
the width of the right-of-way and, in such case, its width is construed to be tha t 
which is necessary for the use for which the right-of-way was created. . . ."); 
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Court of Kansas stated in an oft-quoted opinion 
The law appears to be settled that where the width, length and lo-
cation of an easement for ingress and egress have been expressly 
set forth in the instrument the easement is specific and definite 
The expressed terms of the grant or reservation are controlling in 
such case and considerations of what may be necessary or reason-
able to a present use of the dominant estate are not controlling If, 
however, the width, length and location of an easement for ingress 
and egress are not fixed by the terms of the grant or reservation the 
dominant estate is ordinarily entitled to a way of such width, length 
and location as is sufficient to afford necessary or reasonable ingress 
and egress 5 
North Carolina courts, however, take a significantly more re-
strictive approach to the description issue, holding that an ease-
ment grant or reservation is void for uncertainty if it does not 
adequately describe the location of the easement 6 The Supreme 
Court of Appeals of West Virginia also has adopted the approach 
Crane Hollow, Inc v Marathon Ashland Pipe Line, LLC, 138 Ohio App 3d 57, 
66 71, 740 N E 2d 328, 334 338 (4th Dist Hocking County 2000), Munchmeyer 
v Burfield, 1996 WL 142579, at 3 (Ohio Ct App 4th Dist Washington County 
1996) (citing this treatise), Patterson v Duke Power Co , 256 S C 479, 486, 183 
S E 2d 122, 125 (1971), Smith v Commissioners of Public Works of City of 
Charleston, 312 S C 460, 467 468, 441 S E 2d 331, 336 (Ct App 1994), Atkin 
son v Mentzel, 211 Wis 2d 628, 642, 566 N W 2d 158, 164 (Ct App 1997) 
(" [T]he reasonable convenience of both parties is of prime importance "), 
R C R , Inc v Rainbow Canyon, Inc , 978 P 2d 581, 587 (Wyo 1999) (quoting 
this treatise), 3 Tiffany, Law of Real Property (3d ed ) § 804, Width of Way Cre 
ated by Express Grant , Reservation, or Exception Not Specifying Width, 28 
A L R 2d 253 See also Mugar v Massachuset ts Bay Transp Authority, 28 
Mass App Ct 443, 445, 552 N E 2d 121, 123-124 (1990) (noting general rule, 
but concluding that it is "inapplicable to eminent domain proceedings"), Hall v 
Allen, 771 S W 2d 50, 53 (Mo 1989) ("If the location is not precisely fixed when 
the easement is first created, the grantee is entitled to a convenient, reasonable, 
and accessible use "), Giles v Parker, 304 S C 69, 72-73, 403 S E 2d 130, 132 
(Ct App 1991) (discussing width) 
5Aladdin Petroleum Corp v Gold Crown Properties, Inc , 221 Kan 579, 584, 
561 P 2d 818, 822 (1977) The rule set forth in Aladdin has been quoted with 
approval in several cases See Andersen v Edwards, 625 P 2d 282, 286 (Alaska 
1981), Squaw Peak Community Covenant Church of Phoenix v Anozira 
Development, Inc , 149 Ariz 409, 412, 719 P 2d 295, 298 (Ct App Div 1 1986), 
Consolidated Amusement Co , Ltd v Waikiki Business Plaza, Inc , 6 Haw App 
312, 317, 719 P 2 d 1119, 1123 (1986), Lindhorst v Wright, 1980 OK CIV APP 
42, 616 P 2d 450, 453 (Okla Ct App Div 1 1980) 
In Aladdin, the "easement itself was limited to the specific area between 
two rows of trees, which amounted to a practical location of the right-of way " 
221 Kan 579, 585, 561 P 2d 818, 823 (1977) 
6See Allen v Duvall, 311 N C 245, 249, 316 S E 2d 267, 271 (1984) 
(adhering to view that vague and uncertain description renders easement void, 
but concluding tha t extrinsic evidence may be employed to cure latent ambigu-
c
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tha t an easement is void if it is not adequately described in the 
ins t rument seeking to create it.7 Moreover, a few other courts 
have expressed a comparatively strict s t andard regarding the 
designation of an easement 's location, requiring tha t the ease-
ment description meet the general conveyancing s tandard for 
identifying a parcel of land.8 
Once a court concludes tha t the location or the dimensions of 
the easement are not adequately described in the instrument, it 
generally examines the surrounding circumstances to determine 
the intent of the part ies in this regard.9 The part ies may have 
fixed the location and dimensions of the easement by oral or col-
lateral written agreement.10 If not, the courts look to various fac-
ity in grant or reservation), amount of judgment modified on reh'g, 311 N.C. 
745, 321 S.E.2d 125 (1984); Thompson v. Umberger, 221 N.C. 178, 19 S.E.2d 
484 (1942); Parrish v. Hayworth, 138 N.C. App. 637, 638-642, 532 S.E.2d 202, 
204-206 (2000) (easement not adequately described on plat or by considering 
extrinsic evidence, but subsequent use established location); Wiggins v. Short, 
122 N.C. App. 322, 326-328, 469 S.E.2d 571, 575-576 (1996) (express easement 
failed because its location could not be determined); Williams v. Skinner, 93 
N.C. App. 665, 671-672, 379 S.E.2d 59, 63-64 (1989) (applying North Carolina 
rule that latent ambiguity in description of easement may be made certain by 
use of parol evidence, whereas pa tent ambiguity renders easement void for 
uncertainty); Adams v. Severt , 40 N.C. App. 247, 249, 252 S.E.2d 276, 278 
(1979) ("The deed gives no beginning point and furnishes no means by which 
the location of the proposed way may be ascertained. The ambiguity is a patent 
one. Hence the at tempted conveyance or reservation is void for uncertainty."). 
7Highway Properties v. Dollar Sav. Bank, 189 W. Va. 301, 431 S.E.2d 95, 98-
100 (1993) (quoting Allen v. Duvall with approval). 
8See, e.g., Germany v. Murdock, 99 N.M. 679, 681, 662 P.2d 1346, 1348 
(1983) (requiring a description from which a surveyor can locate the easement 
on the servient estate, but noting that "the easement can be ascertained from 
the recorded documents and in fact was located by two registered surveyors"); 
Vrabel v. Donahoe Creek Watershed Authority, 545 S.W.2d 53, 54 (Tex. Civ. 
App. Austin 1976) ("The description requires a certainty such that a surveyor 
can go upon the land and locate the easement from such description."). See also 
Mueller v. Hoblyn, 887 P.2d 500, 505, 62 A.L.R.5th 847 (Wyo. 1994) ("Presently, 
Wyoming law requires specific descriptions for easements recorded after May 
20, 1981."); Wyo. Stat . § 34-1-141 (easement created without specific location is 
void unless description of location is recorded within one year of execution of 
easement). 
9See cases cited supra note 3. See generally Location of Easement of Way 
Created by Grant Which Does Not Specify Location, 24 A.L.R. 4th 1053 (discuss-
ing var ious factors cour t s consider in a sce r t a in ing location t h a t pa r t i es 
intended); Width of Way Created by Express Grant, Reservation, or Exception 
Not Specifying Width, 28 A.L.R. 2d 253 (analyzing matters courts examine in 
determining width parties intended). 
10See Tipperman v. Tsiatsos, 140 Or. App. 282, 286, 915 P.2d 446, 449 (1996) 
("The location of the easement . . . may be determined . . . by subsequent 
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tors to establish a reasonable description of the easement.11 As 
noted by the highest court of Kentucky, this process "taxes the 
best resources of judicial ingenuity."12 One factor is the purpose 
of the easement,13 which is particularly important with respect to 
ascertaining the dimensions of an inadequately described 
easement.14 Other factors include the geographic relationship be-
tween the dominant and the servient estates,15 the use of each of 
agreement."), review allowed, 324 Or. 176, 922 P.2d 669 (1996) and decision 
affd in part and modified on other grounds, 327 Or. 539, 964 P.2d 1015 (1998); 
Smith v. King, 27 Wash. App. 869, 871, 620 P.2d 542, 543, 24 A.L.R.4th 1049 
(Div. 1 1980) (location can be established by oral agreement); see also Barton v. 
Gammell, 143 Ga. App. 291, 295-296, 238 S.E.2d 445, 448 (1977) (location of 
unlocated easements for use of lake, garden, and pasture found "never . . . in 
dispute" because "[tlhe lake has been constructed and is shown on a plat of the 
property also showing the dominant and servient tenements, and . . . the 
pas ture and garden a reas have been set apa r t and denned . . . and . . . 
plaintiffs have been using those areas with defendants' active participation and 
assistance"); Umberger v. Sta te ex rel. Dept of Game, Fish and Parks, 248 
N.W.2d 395, 397 (S.D. 1976) (easement ins t rument specifically provided for 
mutual agreement as to route). 
11See sources cited infra notes 13-18; R.C.R., Inc. v. Rainbow Canyon, Inc., 
978 P.2d 581, 587 (Wyo. 1999) (citing this treatise). 
12Daniel v. Clarkson, 338 S.W.2d 691, 692 (Ky. 1960). 
13Hynes v. City of Lakeland, 451 So. 2d 505, 511 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 2d Dis t 
1984); State ex rel. Hillhouse v. Hunter Raffety Elevator, Inc., 636 S.W.2d 400, 
402 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 1982). 
14See Carnemella v. Sadowy, 147 A.D.2d 874, 876, 538 N.Y.S.2d 96, 98 (3d 
Dep't 1989) ("The width is not described but [the] Supreme Court has most ap-
propriately stated tha t the width should be tha t ordinarily and reasonably 
required for a utility line as contemplated herein."); Crane Hollow, Inc. v. 
Marathon Ashland Pipe Line, LLC, 138 Ohio App. 3d 57, 66-71, 740 N.E.2d 328, 
334-338 (4th Dist. Hocking County 2000) (ascertaining width of pipeline ease-
ment); Tipperman v. Tsiatsos, 140 Or. App. 282, 286-289, 915 P.2d 446, 449-
451 (1996), review allowed, 324 Or. 176, 922 P.2d 669 (1996) and decision affd 
in part and modified on other grounds, 327 Or. 539, 964 P.2d 1015 (1998); Flo-
rek v. Com., Dept. of Transp. , 89 Pa. Commw. 483, 490, 493 A 2d 133, 137 
(1985) ("[W]e cannot say that placing this [drainage] pipe in the same location, 
albeit a t different depth, was inconsistent with the original purpose of the 
easement."); Patterson v. Duke Power Co., 256 S.C. 479, 486, 183 S.E.2d 122, 
124 (1971) ("Where a deed or other instrument grants the right-of-way but does 
not specify the width of such way, the determination of the width becomes basi-
cally a matter of the construction of the instrument with strong consideration 
being given to what is reasonably convenient and necessary to accomplish the 
purpose for which the way was created."); Moore v. Reynolds, 285 S.C. 574, 579, 
330 S.E.2d 542, 545 (Ct. App. 1985); Clearwater Realty Co. v. Bouchard, 146 Vt. 
359, 361-362, 505 A.2d 1189, 1190-1191 (1985). 
15Perkins v. Perkins, 158 Me. 345, 350, 184 A.2d 678, 681 (1962); Barton's 
Motel, Inc. v. Saymore Trophy Co., Inc., 113 N.H. 333, 335, 306 A.2d 774, 776 
(1973). 
c
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the estates,16 the benefit to the easement holder compared to the 
burden on the servient es ta te owner,17 and admissions of the 
parties 18 But the factor tha t the courts most frequently rely on is 
use of the servient estate for the purpose for which the easement 
was created 19 
Use existing at the time of the easement's creation is considered 
strong evidence of the intended location and dimensions of the 
easement 2 0 This is particularly t rue if the ins t rument creating 
the easement makes some reference to an existing way 21 Use 
16Barton's Motel, Inc v Saymore Trophy Co , Inc , 113 N H 333, 335, 306 
A 2d 774, 776 (1973) 
17Perkins v Perkins, 158 Me 345, 350, 184 A 2d 678, 681 (1962), State ex 
rel Hillhouse v Hunter Raffety Elevator, Inc , 636 S W 2d 400, 402 (Mo Ct 
App S D 1982), Barton's Motel, Inc v Saymore Trophy Co , Inc , 113 N H 333, 
335, 306 A 2d 774, 776 (1973), see also Tipperman v Tsiatsos, 140 Or App 282, 
289, 915 P 2d 446, 451 (1996), review allowed, 324 Or 176, 922 P 2d 669 (1996) 
and decision affd in par t and modified on other grounds, 327 Or 539, 964 P 2d 
1015 (1998), Clearwater Realty Co v Bouchard, 146 Vt 359, 361-362, 505 A 2d 
1189, 1191 (1985) (approving trial court's balancing "reasonable, convenient, 
and accessible right-of way" for owner of dominant estate against potential in-
convenience or interference with servient estate owner's use of servient land) 
18Kotick v Durrant , 143 Fia 386, 392, 196 So 802, 805 (1940), Hynes v City 
of Lakeland, 451 So 2d 505, 511 (Fla Dist Ct App 2d Dist 1984) 
19See Location of Easement of Way Created by Grant Which Does Not Specify 
Location, 24 A L R 4th 1053, 1058, 1065 1084, and cases cited therein 
20See Wilson v DeGenaro, 36 Conn Supp 200, 201-209, 415 A 2d 1334, 
1335-1339 (Super Ct 1979), adopted, 181 Conn 480, 435 A 2d 1021 (1980) (lo 
cation and width of r ight of way), Conley v Whittlesey, 133 Idaho 265, 2 6 9 -
270, 985 P 2d 1127, 1131-1132 (1999) (width of road), Vallas v Johnson, 72 111 
App 3d 281, 282-284, 28 111 Dec 580, 390 N E 2d 939, 941-942 (3d Dist 1979) 
(width of easement of ingress and egress) Larson v Amundson, 414 N W 2d 
413, 417-418 (Minn Ct App 1987) (recognizing principle, but finding that orig-
inal road did not become location of unlocated roadway easement because servi 
ent owner had reserved right to fix location of new road), Mosher v Hart, 157 
A D 2d 931, 931-932, 550 N Y S 2d 187, 188 (3d Dep't 1990) (location of right 
of way), Sacco v Narragansett Elec Co , 505 A 2d 1153, 1155-1156 (R I 1986) 
(location of right of way), Moore v Reynolds, 285 S C 574, 578 579, 330 S E 2d 
542, 545 (Ct App 1985) (width of road), Cleveland v Tinagha, 1998 SD 91, 582 
N W 2d 720, 723 725 (S D 1998) (width of access easements), Jones v Fuller, 
856 S W 2d 597, 602 (Tex App Waco 1993) (existing roadway established loca-
tion), R C R , Inc v Rainbow Canyon, Inc , 978 P 2d 581, 587-588 (Wyo 1999) 
(quoting this treatise and concluding that "the intent of the parties in this case 
is that the easement was defined by the access road in existence at the time the 
easement was created") 
21See Wilson v DeGenaro, 36 Conn Supp 200, 200-204, 415 A 2d 1334, 
1335-1338 (Super Ct 1979) (instrument referred to "the driftway as now laid 
out" (emphasis in original)), adopted, 181 Conn 480, 435 A 2d 1021 (1980), 
Cleveland v Tmagha, 1998 SD 91, 582 N W 2d 720, 723-725 (S D 1998) (deeds 
referred to "existing trails and roadways"), Travis v Madden, 493 N W 2d 717, 
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commenced after the execution of the easement and to which the 
servient estate owner acquiesces is also persuasive.22 However, 
the courts must be careful to determine the location and dimen-
sions of the easement on the basis of the circumstances at the 
time the easement was created.23 Once an inadequately described 
easement is fixed by use and acquiescence, the holder cannot suc-
cessfully claim that a different width or route is reasonably con-
venient or necessary.24 
719-720 (S.D. 1992) (grant referred to "roadway presently existing"); Was key v. 
Lewis, 224 Va. 206, 211, 294 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1982) ("When an ins t rument 
refers to and grants a right of way over an already existing road, the right of 
way is limited to the width of the road as it existed at the time of the grant."); 
Width of Way Created by Express Grant, Reservation, or Exception Not Specify-
ing Width, 28 A.L.R. 2d 253. 
22See Isenberg v. Woitchek, 144 Colo 394, 399-400, 356 P.2d 904, 907 (1960) 
(location and width of right-of-way); Gjovig v. Spino, 701 P.2d 1267, 1268 (Colo. 
Ct. App. 1985) (location and dimensions of easement of ingress and egress); 
Peters v. Milks Grove Special Drainage Dist. No. 1 of Iroquois County, 243 111. 
App. 3d 14, 18-19, 183 111. Dec. 141, 610 N.E.2d 1385, 1389 (3d Dist 1993) (lo-
cation and width of drainage easement); Hall v. Allen, 771 S W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. 
1989) (location of access easement); Area Real Estate Associates, Inc. v. City of 
Raymore, 699 S.W.2d 461, 463-464 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1985) (location of sewer 
line); Green v. Mann, 237 A.D.2d 566, 567, 655 N.Y.S.2d 627, 629 (2d Dep't 
1997) (holding that "longtime use, without objection by the servient tenement, 
establishes the location of the easement"); Parrish v. Hayworth, 138 N.C App. 
637, 642, 532 S.E.2d 202, 204, 206 (2000) (easement not adequately described 
on plat or by considering extrinsic evidence, but subsequent use established lo-
cation); Crane Hollow, Inc. v. Marathon Ashland Pipe Line, LLC, 138 Ohio App. 
3d 57, 67-69, 740 N.E 2d 328, 335-336 (4th Dist. Hocking County 2000) (citing 
this treatise); Flaherty v. DeHaven, 302 Pa. Super. 412, 416-417, 448 A.2d 
1108, 1111 (1982) (location of right-of-way); R.C.R., Inc. v. Rainbow Canyon, 
Inc., 978 P.2d 581, 587 (Wyo. 1999) (quoting this treatise); Edgcomb v. Lower 
Valley Power and Light, Inc., 922 P.2d 850, 854-855 (Wyo. 1996) (holding that 
"current location of the transmission line is the one the parties intended" and 
quoting this treatise). 
23See Wilson v. DeGenaro, 36 Conn. Supp. 200, 209, 415 A.2d 1334, 1339 
(Super. Ct. 1979), adopted, 181 Conn 480, 435 A.2d 1021 (1980); Vailas v. 
Johnson, 72 111. App. 3d 281, 282, 28 111. Dec. 580, 390 N.E.2d 939, 941 (3d Dis t 
1979); R.C.R., Inc. v. Rainbow Canyon, Inc., 978 P.2d 581, 587 (Wyo. 1999) (cit-
ing this treatise). 
24City of Los Angeles v. Howard, 244 Cal. App. 2d 538, 541 n. 1, 53 Cal. Rptr. 
274, 276 n. l (2d Dist. 1966) ("A 'floating easement' [power line in this case] . . . 
becomes 'fixed' by the first usage thereof and, unless the right to change or 
expand the usage is expressly granted or reserved, the usage may not thereaf-
te r be modified, e i t h e r in location or in degree beyond t h a t or iginal ly 
established."); Wilson v. DeGenaro, 36 Conn. Supp. 200, 209, 415 A.2d 1334, 
1338-1339 (Super. Ct. 1979), adopted, 181 Conn. 480, 435 A.2d 1021 (1980) 
(right-of-way); Peters v. Milks Grove Special Drainage Dist. No. 1 of Iroquois 
County, 243 111. App. 3d 14, 18-19, 183 111. Dec. 141, 610 N.E.2d 1385, 1389 (3d 
e
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§ 7:7 —Practical impact of floating easements 
Research References 
West's Key Number Digest, Easements <S=>46 
Floating easements , as unlocated easements are commonly 
called,1 have a significant pract ical impact on the serv ient 
tenement. These easements burden the entire servient estate and 
therefore tend to hamper development, limit financing possibili-
t ies, and impede alienation of the property.2 Hence, when an 
easement is intent ional ly drafted as a floating servi tude, the 
owner of the servient tenement should seek to include provisions 
that limit the easement to a certain portion of the servient estate 
and tha t require the holder to designate its precise location 
within a set period. In addition, the servient owner should seek 
to include a provision in the easement requiring the easement 
holder to execute a recordable instrument describing the selected 
location. In a t least one jurisdiction, the easement holder may 
Dist. 1993) (drainage ditch); Crane Hollow, Inc. v. Marathon Ashland Pipe Line, 
LLC, 138 Ohio App. 3d 57, 67-68, 740 N.E.2d 328, 335 (4th Dist . Hocking 
County 2000) (citing this treatise); Munchmeyer v. Burfield, 1996 WL 142579, 
at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 4th Dist. Washington County 1996) (citing this treatise); 
Houston Pipe Line Co. v. Dwyer, 374 S.W.2d 662, 666 (Tex. 1964) (gas pipeline); 
Mielke v. Yellowstone Pipeline Co., 73 Wash. App. 621, 624, 870 P.2d 1005, 
1006 (Div. 3 1994) ("Where the grant of an easement does not specify its loca-
tion, Washington courts have long held the initial selection of a location fixes 
the location of the easement."); Edgcomb v. Lower Valley Power and Light, Inc., 
922 P.2d 850, 854-855 (Wyo. 1996) (quoting this treatise). See generally §§ 7:13 
to 7:16 (discussing relocation), § 7:17 (analyzing change in dimensions). But see 
Zettlemoyer v. Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp., 540 Pa. 337, 657 A.2d 920, 
926 (1995) (finding tha t "clearing of 30 additional feet beyond the 100 foot wide 
right of way established in 1958 was 'reasonable and necessary* to effectuate 
the purposes of the g ran t" and s ta t ing: "We do not agree t h a t ' subsequent 
agreement, use, and acquiescence* of an easement establishes its width as a 
matter of law when the written agreement is ambiguous."); see generally Recent 
Decision, Eminent Domain—De Facto Taking—Easements, 34 Duq. L. Rev. 739 
(1996) (discussing Zettlemoyer). 
[Sec t ion 7:7] 
1See § 7:4, note 1 and accompanying text (defining and giving illustrations of 
floating easements). 
2Missouri Public Service Co. v. Argenbright, 457 S.W.2d 777, 780-783 (Mo. 
1970); R.C.R, Inc. v. Rainbow Canyon, Inc., 978 P.2d 581, 587 (Wyo. 1999) (cit-
ing this treatise); Edgcomb v. Lower Valley Power and Light, Inc., 922 P.2d 850, 
854-855 (Wyo. L996) (citing th i s t rea t i se ) ; Hazen, E a s e m e n t s From the 
Viewpoint of the Title Insurer, 15 CaL St. BJ 28, 32 (1940); Note, Real Property: 
The Effect of Floating Easements Held by Pipeline Companies on Marketability 
of Title and Land Values, 37 Okla. L. Rev. 180, 181-186 (1984); see also 
McArthur v. Eas t Tennessee Na tu ra l Gas Co., 813 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Tenn. 
1991). 
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have certain duties in this regard even when the easement instru-
ment is silent on the subject. Citing public policy considerations, 
such as safety, the Supreme Court of Tennessee required the 
holder of a floating natural gas pipeline easement to record notice 
of the location it selected for the easement.3 It is unclear, however, 
whether this decision applies to natural gas pipeline easements 
only, utility easements in general, or all floating easements. 
One who holds tit le to land already burdened by a floating 
easement may minimize the burden of the easement by entering 
into an agreement wi th the easement holder regarding the 
easement's location.4 This agreement may take the form of the 
holder's release of the easement from all but a specified portion of 
the servient estate.5 If the parties cannot reach an agreement on 
the subject, the servient owner should consider seeking a court 
decree fixing a reasonable location.6 
§ 7:8 —Grants of mult iple floating easements 
Research References 
West's Key Number Digest, Easements @=>46 
Some express grants , particularly those involving pipelines, 
provide that the servient estate is burdened by any easement of a 
3McArthur v. East Tennessee Natural Gas Co., 813 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Tenn. 
1991); see also Scherger v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 575 N.W.2d 578, 581 
(Minn. 1998) (discussing, but finding inapplicable, Minn. Stat. § 300.045 which 
requi res "public service corporat ions, including pipeline companies ," to 
"definitely and specifically describe" easements they obtain). 
4Kratovil and Werner, Real Estate Law § 4.06(a) (9th e d ) (discussing float-
ing pipeline easements); Note, Real Property: The Effect of Floating Easements 
Held by Pipeline Companies on Marketability of Title and Land Values, 37 
Okla L. Rev. 180, 188-192 (1984). See also Scherger v. Northern Natural Gas 
Co., 575 N.W.2d 578, 581 (Minn. 1998) (discussing, but finding inapplicable, 
Minn. Stat . § 300.045 which requires "public service corporations, including 
pipeline companies," holding recorded easements that do "not include a definite 
and specific description," to, "upon wri t ten request by the specific property 
owner, produce and record . . . a definite and specific description"). 
5Kratovil and Werner, Real Estate Law § 4.06(a) (9th ed ); Note, Real Prop-
erty: The Effect of Floating Easements Held by Pipeline Companies on Market-
ability of Title and Land Values, 37 Okla. L. Rev. 180, 188-189 (1984). For a 
sample "Partial Release of Rights of Way Grants" used with floating pipeline 
easements, see id. a t 193-194. 
6Note, Real Property: The Effect of Floating Easements Held by Pipeline 
Companies on Marketability of Title and Land Values, 37 Okla. L. Rev. 180, 
188-192 (1984). 
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§ 7:16.1 Re loca t ion—Res ta t emen t (Third) of P roper ty ' s approach to 
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sive citator information, including citations to other decisions and secondary 
materials 
§7:1 Introduction 
n. 5. 
Amend citation to Kratovil and Werner in second sentence of note 5 by deleting 
"24-25 (9th ed.)" and substituting therefor "26-27 (10th ed.)." 
Add to "see generally" material in note 5: 
; Werner, Real Es ta te Law 21-22 (11th ed.) (offering guidelines for drafting 
easements) 
§ 7:2 Location and dimensions of express easements 
n. 1. 
Add after Hazen, Easements From the Viewpoint of the Title Insurer citation 
in note 1: 
; Mitchell v. Chance, 2004 WL 792067, *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (citing this 
treatise) 
n. 2. 
Stevens v. Mannix, 77 P.3d 931, 932-933 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003); 
Village of Wagon Mound v. Mora Trust, 2003 -NMCA- 035, 133 N.M. 373, 3 8 3 -
384, 62 P.3d 1255, 1265-1266 (Ct. App. 2002), cert, denied, 133 N.M. 413, 63 
P.3d 516 (2003); 
Mitchell v. Chance, 2004 WL 792067, *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (citing this trea-
tise); 
Vinson v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 221, 227 (Tex. App. Austin 2002); 
§ 7:4 Location and dimensions of express easements— 
Location or dimensions omitted or inadequately 
described 
n. L 
Add to "See also" material in first paragraph of note 1: 
Coughlm v. Anderson, 270 Conn. 487, 494 n.7, 853 A.2d 460, 466 n.7 (2004) (cit-
ing this treatise); 
Village of Wagon Mound v. Mora Trust, 2003 -NMCA- 035, 133 N.M. 373, 383-
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384, 62 P.3d 1255, 1265-1266 (Ct. App. 2002), cert, denied, 133 N.M. 413, 63 
P.3d 516 (2003); 
Sunnyside Valley Irr. Dist. v. Dickie, 149 Wash. 2d 873, 880, 73 P.3d 369, 372 
(2003) ("An easement denned in general terms, without a definite location or de-
scription is called a floating or roving easement . . . ."); 
Add to "See ' material in second paragraph of note 1: 
Evans v. Board of County Com'rs of Utah County, 2004 UT App 256, 97 P.3d 
697, 700 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) ("roving easement"); 
Sunnyside Valley Irr. Dist. v. Dickie, 149 Wash. 2d 873, 880, 73 P.3d 369, 372 
(2003) ("roving easement"); 
§ 7:5 Location and dimensions of express easements— 
Location or dimensions omitted or inadequately 
described—Designation by part ies 
n. 1. 
Add to "E.g." cases in note 1: - ' 
Vinson v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 221, 228 (Tex. App. Austin 2002) (grantor did not 
exercise "expressly reserved . . . right to mark and establish boundaries of the 
park"); 
Add at end of note 1: 
See also Village of Wagon Mound v. Mora Trust, 2003 -NMCA- 035, 133 N.M. 
373, 384, 62 P.3d 1255, 1266 (Ct. App. 2002), cert, denied, 133 N.M. 413, 63 
P.3d 516 (2003) ("[I]t is not unusual for a deed creating a floating easement to 
give the easement holder the right to later locate and fix the easement upon the 
ground."). 
n. 5. 
Add to "But See" case in note 5: 
Vinson v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 221, 228 (Tex. App. Austin 2002); 
; Sunnyside Valley Irr. Dist. v. Dickie, 111 Wash. App. 209, 215, 43 P.3d 1277, 
1281 (Div. 3 2002), review granted, 147 Wash. 2d 1020, 60 P.3d 93 (2002), affd 
on other grounds, 149 Wash. 2d 873, 73 P.3d 369 (2003) (lower court -noting: 
"When the description of an easeinent is not specified with the grant, the loca-
tion is established and fixed when the grantee selects the location of the 
easement.") 
§ 7:6 Location and dimensions of express easements— 
Location or dimensions omitted or inadequately 
described—Designation by court 
n. 3. 
Add to "See" cases in note 3: 
Illig v. U.S., 58 Fed. CI. 619, 626 (2003) (citing this treatise); 
Mitchell v. Chance, 2004 WL 792067, *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (citing this trea-
tise); 
n. 4. 
Add to "See also" cases in note 4: 
Walker v. Boozer, 140 Idaho 451, 95 P.3d 69, 72-73 (2004) (establishing width); 
Intermount Distribution, Inc. v. Public Service Co. of North Carolina, Inc., 150 
N.C. App. 539, 542-544, 563 S.E.2d 626, 629-630 (2002) (considering width of 
easement for natural gas pipeline); 
rc. 6. 
Add to "See" cases in note 6: 
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King v. King, 146 N.C. App. 442, 444-445, 552 S.E.2d 262, 264-265 (2001) 
(distinguishing between patent ambiguity in description which is fatal to ease-
ment and latent ambiguity which may be made certain by reference to extrinsic 
evidence, and determining that ambiguity in consent judgement's description of 
easement location was latent); 
n. 11. 
Add before R.C.R., Inc. v. Rainbow Canyon, Inc. citation in note 11: 
Mitchell v. Chance, 2004 WL 792067, *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (citing this trea-
tise); 
n. 13. 
Sunnyside Valley Irr. Dist. v. Dickie, 149 Wash. 2d 873, 878-887, 73 R3d 369, 
372-375 (2003). 
n. 14. 
; Intermount Distribution, Inc. v. Public Service Co. of North Carolina, Inc., 150 
N.C. App. 539, 542-544, 563 S.E.2d 626, 629-630 (2002) (considering width of 
easement for natural gas pipeline) 
Sunnyside Valley Irr. Dist. v. Dickie, 149 Wash. 2d 873, 880, 73 P.3d 369, 372 
(2003)("Under the doctrine of reasonable enjoyment, the width is restricted to 
tha t which is reasonably necessary and convenient to effectuate the original 
purpose for granting the easement."). 
n.20. 
Add to "See" cases in note 20: 
Ponderosa Pines Ranch, Inc. v. Hevner, 2002 MT 184, 311 Mont. 82, 86-88, 53 
P.3d 381, 384-386 (2002) (citing this treatise); 
n.21. 
Add ", 267-271" at end of 28 A.L.R. 2d 253 citation in note 21. 
n. 22. 
Add to "See" cases in note 22: 
Village of Wagon Mound v. Mora Trust, 2003 -NMCA- 035, 133 N.M. 373, 384, 
62 P.3d 1255, 1266 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002), cert, denied, 133 N.M. 413, 63 P.3d 
516 (2003); 
Vinson v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 221, 228 (Tex. App. Austin 2002); 
§ 7:7 Location and dimensions of express easements— 
Practical impact of floating easements 
71. 2. 
Add to "see also" case in note 2: 
Coughlin v. Anderson, 270 Conn. 487, 494 n.7, 853 A.2d 460, 466 n.7 (2004) (cit-
ing this treatise); 
§ 7:9 Location and dimensions of express easements— 
Designation of area for easement does not 
necessarily represent easement boundaries 
n. 1. 
Add to "see" cases in note 1: 
Sand Lake Shoppes Family Ltd. Par tnership v. Sand Lake Courtyards, L.C., 
816 So. 2d 143, 145-146 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 2002); 
Amend sentence accompanying note 9 by deleting "neither party 
can" and substituting therefor "the easement holder cannot." 
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§12 02(b) UTAH REAL PROPERTY L A W §12 02(b)(2) 
other non-crop substances. Generally, profits a prendre are treated the same way 
as easements.16 
§ 12.02(b), Creation. 
§ 12.02(b)(1). Express Easements. 
An easement may be created by express words of either a formal grant or of a 
reservation or exception in a conveyance of land. A grant creates an easement in 
the grantee, while a reservation may result in creating an easement for the grantor 
m the land being conveyed. Easements may also be created as a covenant or 
hrough a conveyance referring either to a plat depicting easements or to a 
-ecorded declaration of easements. The same formalities apply to creation of 
casements as in any other conveyance. As an easement is a property interest, the 
creating instrument must satisfy the statute of frauds.18 The document should also 
?e recorded in order to provide constructive notice to any subsequent purchaser. 
Otherwise someone might purchase the property free of the easement under the 
loctrine protecting a subsequent bona fide purchaser without notice.19 
Questions of interpretation often arise regarding: (1) the extent of the easement 
md (2) whether it is appurtenant or m gross.20 To avoid future litigation the 
Iraftsman must use great care to identify clearly and specifically: (1) the parties, 
2) the properties involved, (3) the kind of easement created (appurtenant or in 
pross), and (4) the limits, permitted uses and duration of the easement.21 
A recital of consideration should be included if the grant of easement is not 
ncorporated in the conveyance of the underlying fee.22 
§ 12.02(b)(2). Implied Easements. 
Implied easements are three specific types — implied easements based on a 
rior use, easements by necessity and easements implied from a subdivision plat. 
Vhile express easements are created by written expressions of intent, implied 
asements arise from the circumstances of a transaction or the circumstances 
16. See BACKMAN & THOMAS, supra note 5, at § 1 01[2][e], RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 399, 
>mment b 
17. Robert Kratovil, Easement Draftsmanship and Conveyancing, 38 CAL L REV. 426,437-38 (1950) 
18. Warburton v Virginia Beach Federal Sav & Loan Ass'n, 899 P.2d 779,781-782 (Utah 1995) 
19. See 4 R POWELL & P ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 34 21 (Matthew Bender 
>98), BACKMAN & THOMAS, supra note 5, at § 1.02[1] 
20. Weggleland v Ujifusa, 384 P 2d 590 (Utah 1963) 
21. A model form for the creation of an easement is included m ROBERT KRATOVIL, REAL 
,TATE LAW 32-33 (Prentice-Hall 8th ed 1979), See Warburton v Virginia Beach Fed Sav & 
>an Assoc, 899 P 2d 779, 782 (Utah 1995) See also Potter v Chadaz, 977 P 2d 533 (Utah Ct 
>p 1999) Cannot create an easement in favor of a third party who is a stranger to the transaction 
22. See Green v Stansfield, 886 P 2d 117 (Utah Ct App 1994) 
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interruptions will suffice to prevent the prescnptive period from accruing. The 
claimant would then have to start over in counting the required prescriptive period. 
The same rules apply to both prescriptive easements and adverse possession 
with regard to disabilities and the concept of tacking.49 Thus, as with adverse 
possession cases, any incompetence based on infancy or mental condition of the 
landowner at the beginning of the prescriptive time prevents the running of the 
statute of limitations. Only possessory ownership is subject to interests arising 
through prescnptive easements. Thus, remaindermen or other non-possessory future 
interests are not affected until those interests become possessory. If the claimant and 
his predecessors in interest ha^„ all met the requirements of prescription, their 
successive penods of adverfiyji^e may be joined to meet the twenty-year 
requirement. The successive adverse users must be in privity with one another, 
which is commonly established by the documents of sale of the dominant estate. 
Conveyance of the servient estate during the prescriptive period does not 
interrupt the running of the period, but it may become important in determining 
whether the servient owners knew or should have known of the use during the 
entire period.50 ~ 
Finally, government entities are not subject to the doctrine of prescriptive 
easements. As the sovereign, the statute of limitations underlying the concept of 
adverse possession or prescriptive easements is not applicable.51 
§ 12.02(c). Rights and Duties of Parties. 
Both the easement owner and the owner of the servient estate must exercise 
their rights so as not to interfere unreasonably with each other. If based on an 
explicit grant, the extent of an easement is determined by the grant. 
Interpretation is often required to determine the extent or scope of the 
easement. Disputes occur regarding the easement's precise location or its 
boundaries, its duration and what kinds of uses are permitted. Factors to be 
considered in determining the easement's extent include (1) the express language 
of the creating instrument, (2) the behavior of the parties at the time of the 
easement's creation and their actions in arriving at their own interpretation of the 
easement, and (3) the foreseeability of any challenged changes.54 The most 
crucial starting point is the language of the written instrument. The parties, for 
instance, can alter the normally applicable doctnnes by their specific language. 
48. Wasatch Irr Co v Fulton, 65 P 205 (Utah 1901) 
49. See 4 POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 19, at § 34 10. 
50. Zollinger v Frank, 175 P.2d 714,718 (Utah 1946). 
51. See BACKMAN & THOMAS, supra note 5, at § 2 02[4][c] 
52. Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co v Moyle, 174 P 2d 148 (Utah 1946). 
53. Weggleland v Ujifusa, 384 P 2d 590 (Utah 1963) 
54. See 4 POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 19, at § 34 12[2] 
55. Labium v Rickenbach, 711 P 2d 225, 226 (Utah 1985), Wykoff v. Barton, 646 P 2d 756, 
758 (Utah 1982). 
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§ 12.02(c) 
u rrio, can specify that the easement holder can benefit property 
For example, the parties y : purchased by the easement holder in 
presently owned as ^ ^ £ P u s / o f P t h e e a s e m e n t to the benefit of those 
the future. Normally ^ ^ S e r at the time the easement is created.56 « 
parcels owned by the ea^e ^ ^
 m u s t d e t e r m i n e b y 
If the writing ^ambig ^ ^ s ,
 I n t h e c a s e o f implied or 
considering the s u ^ o u n a ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
 t h 
prescriptive easemen^
 e s t a b l i s hment of the easement are most 
S S T Z e X r t s e , the court is attempting to determine the intent of the 
parties as to the " ^ ^ ^ ^ u s e is permissible when an easement has 
To determine ^ ^ f ^ , ^ ^
 m u s t be made between that use and 
been created by presc nP"°n '
 w a s Sea t ed 5 8 An easement is limited to the use 
the use ^ ^ J ^ l : : o ^ L easement in gross is also limited to 
for which it was acqu red. ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
 ]oaajm rf 
the person who acquired it. P
 b e ^ b y m e a c t s a n d 
established ease-ent b r u m a l c « ^ ^
 & ^ ^ ^ ^ 
acquiescence erf: tta^ part ^
 w h i c h ^ ^ ^ for ^ b ^ 
enter the servient e s t a t t o m y ^ ^
 u n n e c e s s a r y m j u r y to 
a n d convenient ^ ^ ^ f , ^ parcel, however, may not force the 
the servient estate^ An o ^ . ^ ^ ^
 c o n t r i b u t l 0 n from 
e a s e m ^ t h o l t o t o i n ^ P
 maintenance expenditures.62 Nonetheless, 
a non-consenting ea^emem
 & ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
the two parties are, wdUd J ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
 o f t b e 
maintenance of an eas
 b e c a u s e o f n e g l e c t e d 
burdened land face tort towiuy •>
 h easement is given the first 
A s a general ^ 
opportunity to set the scope^o 4
 o w n e r m a y c h o o s e 
location of the easement n * ^ ^
 u J a t i s f i e d d o m i n a n t easement 
any reasonaUe ^ ^ ^ Z r t l Similarly, a landowner is generally able 
with uses permitted under the easement. 
58.Nielsonv.Sandbergl41P. 
59. Crane .Cram, ^
 mith 473 P.2d 905 (Utah 1970). 
60. Lyman Grazing Ass n . .
 mJ) 
S S S S S i " i - . - * • no,= 5, . 5 ..0312,-
64.toW.at§l.03[l][b]. 
«.S«e«tat§1.02W-
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Another scope issue is the extent of permissible change because of passage of 
time and normal evolution of the affected properties.66 Usually, the language 
creating the easement has not anticipated the kinds of alterations or modifications 
sought by the easement holder. As a general rule, courts permit changes if they 
are reasonably foreseeable.67 If the changes are caused by advances in technology, 
the easement use is generally allowed to keep pace with normal developments. For 
example, old easements permitting a right of way for horse drawn carts will 
typically be able to become a paved road for any kind of motorized vehicles. 
The most difficult questions have involved the subdivision of the dominant 
property or the construction of a multi-family dwelling to replace the original 
single-family residence.69 Usually these changes are permitted even though the 
intensity of use is increased. The key is whether the new uses were reasonably 
foreseeable so the court is justified in determining that the expansion is in harmony 
with the original intent of the parties and the purposes they established for the 
easement. The courts will limit the extent of the change, however, if the alterations 
or expansions impose an unreasonable burden on the servient property owner. 
Public policy and the needs of society favor changes and improvements in an 
easement for the benefit of the dominant estate, as long as the manifest intent of 
the original parties was not to disallow changes and the burden on the servient 
estate is not unreasonably increased.70 When there are several owners of an 
easement in common, no one of them may make alterations in the easement 
71 
which will render it less convenient and useful to any one of the others. 
§ 12.02(d). Transfer of Easements. 
Once an easement is created, it becomes part of the burdened property. The 
obligation to recognize the easement holder's rights automatically passes to 
successors unless they are freed from the burden of the easement as bona fide 
purchasers without notice. In modern subdivisions, each property owner is on 
constructive notice of all easements indicated on the original subdivision plat or 
in a Declaration of Restrictions (including easements, real covenants and 
servitudes) provided the plat or declaration are properly recorded in a 
jurisdiction's land records.72 
Even if an easement is not part of the public records, the transfer of the burden 
applies to subsequent owners of the servient property who have notice of the 
66. See 4 POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 19, at § 34.12[2]. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at §34.15. 
69. Id. at §34.21. 
70. Huble v. Cache County Drainage Dist. No. 3, 259 P.2d 893 (Utah 1953). 
71. Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Moyle, 174 P.2d 148 (Utah 1946). 
72. See BACKMAN & THOMAS, supra note 5, at § 1.04[1]. 
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